Bab el-Mandeb

The name means “Gate of Tears” in Arabic, a reference either to the dangers of ancient navigation—treacherous currents, hidden reefs, unpredictable winds—or to a legend of an earthquake that separated Africa from Arabia and drowned those caught between. At its narrowest point, Bab el-Mandeb measures just 26 kilometers across, divided by the island of Perim into two channels. Through this constriction passes all maritime traffic between the suez-canal and the Indian Ocean—a flow that includes roughly 10% of global seaborne trade, over 6 million barrels of oil per day, and significant volumes of liquefied natural gas bound for European markets. In 2023-2024, the world was reminded that this ancient chokepoint retains the power to disrupt the modern global economy.

Geographic Position¶

Bab el-Mandeb lies at the southern terminus of the Red Sea, where the coasts of Yemen and Djibouti approach within sight of each other across waters that have witnessed the passage of traders, warriors, and empires for millennia. The strait connects the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden, which opens into the Arabian Sea and, beyond, the vast Indian Ocean. Geologically, it marks where the African and Arabian tectonic plates are slowly separating, creating the Red Sea rift that will eventually—in tens of millions of years—become a new ocean.

The two channels:

The eastern channel (Bab Iskender), between the Arabian coast and Perim Island, is narrow and shallow—approximately 3 kilometers wide and 30 meters deep. This channel is rarely used by large commercial vessels due to navigational hazards.
The western channel (Dact-el-Mayun), between Perim and the African shore, is wider (approximately 16 kilometers) and deeper (up to 310 meters), carrying the bulk of commercial traffic. The main shipping lane runs through this channel, passing within 10 kilometers of the Djiboutian coast.

The island of Perim (also known as Mayyun), controlled by Yemen, sits in the middle of the strait like a natural fortress. Roughly 13 square kilometers in area, the island has been fortified by various powers throughout history, from the Ottomans to the British, who maintained a coaling station there from 1857 to 1967. The Houthis’ seizure of the island in 2015 alarmed international observers given its commanding position.

Surrounding territories:

Yemen controls the eastern shore, Perim Island, and strategically positioned islands including the Hanish archipelago further north. Yemen’s population of 33 million has been devastated by civil war since 2015.
Djibouti controls the western shore. This nation of fewer than one million people has leveraged its geography to host military bases from six different nations.
Eritrea lies to the north along the African coast of the Red Sea, its authoritarian government maintaining tense relations with neighbors and hosting minimal foreign presence.
Somalia (including the self-declared but unrecognized state of Somaliland) lies to the south along the Gulf of Aden. Somalia’s state collapse from 1991 onward spawned the piracy crisis that drew international naval forces to the region.

This geography places the strait at the intersection of some of the world’s most fragile, conflict-prone, and strategically contested states. No other major chokepoint is surrounded by such concentrated instability.

The Red Sea Corridor¶

Bab el-Mandeb’s strategic significance derives from its position as the southern gate to the Red Sea corridor—the maritime passage connecting the Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean via the suez-canal. This corridor is not merely important; it is one of the arteries upon which the global economy depends.

Any vessel transiting from Asia to Europe through Suez must first pass through Bab el-Mandeb. The same applies in reverse. This creates a linear vulnerability: closure or disruption at any point along the 2,250-kilometer corridor—Suez, the Red Sea, or Bab el-Mandeb—severs the entire route. The corridor has no redundancy; it is a single thread connecting two oceans.

Traffic volumes (pre-2023 crisis):

Approximately 25,000 vessels transit annually—roughly 70 per day
Roughly 6-7 million barrels of oil per day (primarily northbound to Europe and, increasingly, eastward to Asia)
Approximately 8% of global LNG trade, primarily Qatari shipments to Europe
An estimated 12-15% of global trade by value, including container traffic between Asian manufacturing centers and European markets
Cargo valued at approximately $1 trillion annually

The alternative—sailing around the Cape of Good Hope—adds approximately 7,000-9,000 kilometers (depending on origin and destination) and 10-14 days to voyages between the Persian Gulf and the Mediterranean. For a large container ship, the Cape route costs an additional $300,000-$1 million per voyage in fuel, crew wages, and opportunity cost. When Bab el-Mandeb becomes dangerous, these costs must be weighed against insurance premiums and security risks—a calculation that shipping lines made in real-time during 2023-2024.

Historical Significance¶

Bab el-Mandeb has been a maritime crossroads since the dawn of navigation. The monsoon wind patterns that governed Indian Ocean trade for millennia made this strait the seasonal gateway between worlds.

Ancient trade: Frankincense and myrrh from southern Arabia, spices from India, silk from China, gold from Africa—all flowed through these waters. The Queen of Sheba, whose kingdom likely encompassed both shores of the strait, ruled over this lucrative trade. Roman merchants sought to cut out Arab intermediaries and traded directly through the Red Sea. The discovery of seasonal monsoon patterns allowed sailing ships to time passages for favorable winds.

Islamic expansion: Arab traders spread Islam along the coasts of East Africa and into Southeast Asia via the Indian Ocean trade routes that passed through Bab el-Mandeb. The strait became part of the Islamic world’s commercial network linking the Mediterranean to the Spice Islands.

European arrival: The Portuguese rounded the Cape of Good Hope in 1498 and soon sought to control the Red Sea corridor, attacking Aden in 1513 but failing to take it. Ottoman control of both shores kept Europeans out of the Red Sea for centuries. The opening of the suez-canal in 1869 transformed Bab el-Mandeb from a secondary route into a critical chokepoint on the main highway of empire.

British presence: Britain established a coaling station on Perim Island in 1857 and took Aden in 1839, creating a strategic position that commanded the strait’s approaches. The British protectorate of Aden lasted until 1967, when a Marxist insurgency forced withdrawal—part of the broader retreat from empire that the Suez Crisis had foreshadowed.

Cold War competition: South Yemen became a Soviet ally after independence, hosting naval facilities at Aden. The Horn of Africa saw superpower competition as Ethiopia and Somalia shifted alignments. Control of Bab el-Mandeb was contested territory in the global struggle.

Energy Transit¶

For European energy security, Bab el-Mandeb serves as the secondary chokepoint after the strait-of-hormuz. The two straits are linked in a serial chain: oil loaded at Gulf terminals passes through Hormuz, traverses the Arabian Sea, enters the Gulf of Aden, and then must navigate Bab el-Mandeb to reach the Red Sea and ultimately the Mediterranean via Suez. A threat to either strait disrupts the entire flow.

Northbound flows:

Crude oil: Approximately 4.5-5 million barrels per day of Persian Gulf crude destined for European refineries, representing roughly one-third of Europe’s oil imports
LNG: Qatari shipments (Qatar is the world’s second-largest LNG exporter) plus Emirati and Omani cargoes. Following Europe’s 2022 rupture with Russia, Middle Eastern LNG has become critical to European energy security.
Refined products: Gasoline, diesel, and jet fuel from Gulf refineries serving European markets

Southbound flows:

Empty tankers returning to Gulf loading terminals
European manufactured goods, vehicles, and machinery destined for Asian markets
Grain from the Black Sea region (via Suez) to Asian importers—a flow disrupted by both the Ukraine war and Houthi attacks
Military vessels transiting between the Mediterranean and Indian Ocean theaters

Eastbound diversions: Increasingly, Gulf oil flows eastward to China, India, Japan, and South Korea rather than northward to Europe. These vessels pass through Bab el-Mandeb heading in the opposite direction—south into the Gulf of Aden and on to Asian ports. This means Bab el-Mandeb handles two-way energy traffic serving both European and Asian markets.

The interdependence of Hormuz, Bab el-Mandeb, and Suez means that threats to any single chokepoint affect the entire system. An adversary capable of disrupting Bab el-Mandeb gains leverage over European energy supplies even without reaching the Persian Gulf itself. Iran understood this, which is why its support for the Houthis has strategic significance beyond Yemen’s civil war.

The Yemen Conflict and Houthi Threats¶

Since 2015, Yemen has been consumed by civil war—one of the world’s worst humanitarian catastrophes and a conflict that has transformed Bab el-Mandeb from a theoretical vulnerability into an active danger zone. The Houthi movement—officially Ansar Allah (“Supporters of God”)—seized the capital Sanaa in September 2014 and expanded control over much of northern and western Yemen, prompting military intervention by a Saudi-led coalition in March 2015. The resulting war has killed an estimated 150,000 people directly, with hundreds of thousands more dead from famine and disease. Yemen has become an arena of Middle Eastern regional rivalry, with Iran supporting the Houthis and Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and their allies backing the internationally recognized government.

Implications for Bab el-Mandeb:

The Houthis control territory along Yemen’s Red Sea coast, including Hodeidah, the country’s main port, and at various times have controlled or contested islands in the strait itself. This gives them the ability to threaten shipping in both the southern Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb.

Houthi capabilities include:

Anti-ship cruise missiles: Iranian-supplied missiles including variants of the C-802 with ranges of 120+ kilometers, capable of striking vessels well into the Red Sea
Anti-ship ballistic missiles: Including modified Iranian designs capable of targeting vessels from inland launch sites
Naval mines: Sophisticated mines deployed in shipping lanes
Explosive-laden drone boats: Unmanned surface vessels packed with explosives, guided toward targets
Armed drones (UAVs): Iranian-designed Shahed and Samad drones capable of striking vessels at ranges of hundreds of kilometers
Shore-based radar and surveillance: Enabling targeting of specific vessels

Demonstrated attacks (2016-2023):

The Houthis repeatedly demonstrated willingness to attack commercial and military vessels:

October 2016: Attack on the UAE vessel HSV-2 Swift with an anti-ship cruise missile, severely damaging the catamaran
October 2016: Cruise missiles fired at US Navy destroyer USS Mason in the Red Sea, prompting American retaliatory strikes on Houthi radar installations
2017-2022: Multiple attacks on commercial shipping and Saudi coalition vessels, including mining of Hodeidah harbor approaches
January 2022: Attack on UAE-flagged vessel off Hodeidah

The 2023-2024 Crisis:

Following the outbreak of the Gaza conflict in October 2023, the Houthis launched an unprecedented campaign against commercial shipping:

November 2023: Houthis seized the car carrier Galaxy Leader with 25 crew aboard, claiming it was Israeli-linked (it was British-owned, Japanese-operated)
December 2023-present: Dozens of attacks on commercial vessels using missiles, drones, and armed boats. Major shipping lines including Maersk, MSC, Hapag-Lloyd, and CMA CGM suspended Red Sea transits.
Impact: Suez Canal traffic dropped by 40-60% during peak disruption; container shipping rates for Asia-Europe routes increased 200-400%; transit times extended 10-14 days as vessels diverted around Africa
Military response: The United States and United Kingdom launched Operation Prosperity Guardian with naval patrols and, beginning January 2024, airstrikes against Houthi positions in Yemen. Iran-backed attacks continued nonetheless.

The Iranian dimension:

Iran’s support for the Houthis extends its strategic reach to a second critical chokepoint. Tehran already possesses the ability to threaten the strait-of-hormuz; Houthi capabilities at Bab el-Mandeb provide an additional pressure point against Western interests without requiring direct Iranian military action. This “forward defense” strategy allows Iran to impose costs on adversaries far from its borders while maintaining plausible deniability.

The Houthi attacks demonstrate asymmetric warfare at chokepoints: relatively inexpensive missiles and drones threatening vessels worth hundreds of millions of dollars, forcing billion-dollar naval deployments, disrupting trillions in trade. The cost-exchange ratio massively favors the attacker.

Military Presence: Djibouti as Strategic Hub¶

Djibouti, on the African shore of Bab el-Mandeb, has leveraged its geography to become one of the most militarized small states on earth—and one of the clearest examples of how chokepoint geography attracts great power presence. Multiple major powers maintain bases in this nation of just 1 million people and 23,000 square kilometers (roughly the size of New Hampshire).

Foreign military installations:

United States: Camp Lemonnier, established in 2002 on a former French Foreign Legion base, is the only permanent US military installation in Africa. Approximately 4,000 personnel operate from the base, which hosts drones, aircraft, and special operations forces. It serves as headquarters for Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) and supports counterterrorism operations across East Africa, Yemen, and the Arabian Peninsula. The US pays Djibouti approximately $63 million annually in rent.
France: France maintains its largest military presence in Africa at Djibouti, with approximately 1,500 personnel reflecting colonial history (Djibouti was French Somaliland until 1977). The French base hosts aircraft, helicopters, and naval facilities. France’s presence predates all others and reflects ongoing interests in the Red Sea and Indian Ocean.
China: In 2017, China opened its first overseas military base in Djibouti, marking a historic expansion of Chinese military presence beyond the Western Pacific. The base, located just 8 kilometers from Camp Lemonnier, can accommodate naval vessels including destroyers and potentially aircraft carriers. It supports Chinese anti-piracy operations and naval logistics in the Indian Ocean. The 10-year lease reportedly costs $20 million annually. The base represents China’s recognition that protecting its expanding global interests requires forward presence at critical chokepoints.
Japan: Japan maintains a base supporting its anti-piracy mission in the Gulf of Aden—its first overseas military facility since World War II. Approximately 180 personnel operate P-3C maritime patrol aircraft and support vessels. The Japanese presence, though modest, signals Tokyo’s expanding security role beyond East Asia.
Italy: Italy operates a military support base (Base Militare Nazionale di Supporto) with approximately 300 personnel, supporting naval presence and EU anti-piracy operations.
Other presence: Spain operates a small contingent supporting EU operations. Saudi Arabia and the UAE have discussed establishing facilities, though negotiations have stalled.

This concentration reflects Djibouti’s unique position: it offers direct access to Bab el-Mandeb, proximity to the Arabian Peninsula (Yemen is visible across the strait), and a staging point for operations in East Africa, Yemen, Somalia, and the broader Indian Ocean. The waters off Djibouti see American, Chinese, French, Japanese, and other naval vessels operating in close proximity—a microcosm of great power competition.

For Djibouti, hosting foreign bases provides revenue (estimated at over $300 million annually), security guarantees from multiple major powers, and leverage that keeps President Ismail Omar Guelleh’s authoritarian government secure. For the foreign powers, the bases provide presence at a critical chokepoint, the ability to project power into adjacent regions, and—increasingly—the need to monitor each other.

Piracy and Maritime Security¶

The waters around Bab el-Mandeb have historically been plagued by piracy, particularly emanating from Somalia. Somali piracy peaked between 2008 and 2012, when pirates operating from the lawless Somali coast attacked hundreds of vessels in the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean, capturing ships and crews for ransom.

The Somali piracy crisis:

At its peak, Somali piracy represented a fundamental challenge to maritime security:

2008-2012: Over 200 attacks annually at the crisis peak; successful hijackings generated estimated ransoms of $400 million over this period
Business model: Pirates seized vessels and crews, anchoring them off the Somali coast while negotiating ransoms ranging from $1-12 million per ship. Some vessels and crews were held for years.
Impact: Shipping companies rerouted vessels, hired armed guards, and paid spiking insurance premiums. The Gulf of Aden—the funnel through which all Suez traffic must pass—became a war zone.

International response:

The piracy crisis prompted an unprecedented multilateral naval response—one of the few areas where great powers including the united-states, china, Russia, and European nations cooperated:

EU Naval Force (Operation Atalanta): Launched in 2008, the first EU naval operation, with warships patrolling the Gulf of Aden and escorting vulnerable vessels
Combined Maritime Forces (CTF-151): US-led coalition of 30+ nations focused specifically on counter-piracy
NATO (Operation Ocean Shield): Alliance naval vessels supplemented other operations (2009-2016)
Independent deployments: China, Russia, India, Japan, South Korea, and others deployed naval vessels—often their first sustained operations so far from home waters. The Chinese navy’s anti-piracy missions beginning in 2008 marked a turning point in PLAN operations beyond the Western Pacific.

Measures that worked:

Armed guards on commercial vessels (no ship with armed guards was successfully hijacked)
Best Management Practices (BMP) for vessel security, including evasive maneuvering and creating “citadels” where crews could shelter
Prosecution of captured pirates (though most were released)
Naval patrols and convoy escorts through the high-risk corridor

By 2013, successful hijackings had dropped to near zero. The International Maritime Bureau removed the Gulf of Aden from its highest-risk category.

Residual risks:

Piracy has declined but not disappeared. The underlying conditions that produced Somali piracy—state collapse, poverty, ungoverned coastline, desperation—persist. Any significant reduction in naval presence, armed guards, or vigilance could allow resurgence. The 2017 hijacking of the Aris 13 off Somalia demonstrated that the threat remains latent.

Additionally, the chaos in Yemen has raised concerns about Yemeni-based maritime crime and state-sponsored attacks that blur the line between piracy and warfare—a concern validated by the Houthi campaign beginning in 2023.

Strategic Assessment¶

Bab el-Mandeb illustrates several geopolitical principles.

Chokepoint vulnerability: Like the strait-of-hormuz and suez-canal, Bab el-Mandeb demonstrates how geography concentrates strategic importance. The global economy depends on a handful of narrow passages; those who can threaten these passages possess leverage disproportionate to their conventional military power.

Asymmetric threats: The Houthi example shows how non-state actors or weak states, armed with relatively inexpensive missiles and drones, can threaten sophisticated commercial and military vessels. The cost asymmetry favors the attacker: a missile costing thousands of dollars can threaten a ship worth hundreds of millions.

Extended deterrence: The US and allied military presence around Bab el-Mandeb exists primarily to deter attacks on commercial shipping—extended deterrence protecting the global commons rather than specific national territory.

Great power competition: The concentration of military bases in Djibouti reflects the broader pattern of US-China competition extending into new regions. Bab el-Mandeb is now a point of contact between American and Chinese military forces, with implications for both cooperation and potential friction.

Future Considerations¶

Several factors will shape Bab el-Mandeb’s future significance.

Yemen’s trajectory: Resolution of the Yemen conflict would reduce the most immediate threat to the strait. Continued war, particularly if it further empowers the Houthis or draws in external powers more directly, will perpetuate the danger.

Iranian strategy: Tehran’s approach to the Houthis and to Red Sea shipping more broadly reflects its regional strategy. Accommodation with Saudi Arabia and the West could reduce tensions; confrontation would likely increase attacks.

Energy transition: As global energy consumption shifts away from oil, the volume of tanker traffic through Bab el-Mandeb will eventually decline. However, container traffic—the other major category of shipping—will likely continue growing with global trade.

Climate and migration: The Horn of Africa faces severe climate stress, which could exacerbate instability in the states surrounding Bab el-Mandeb. Climate-driven migration and conflict could create new security challenges.

Conclusion¶

Bab el-Mandeb is the overlooked chokepoint. It lacks the name recognition of the suez-canal or the oil concentration of the strait-of-hormuz, yet it is integral to both. Every barrel of oil and every container moving between Europe and Asia through the Suez corridor must transit the Gate of Tears.

The strait’s position—bounded by Yemen’s civil war, proximate to Somalia’s chronic instability, and increasingly embedded in great power competition—makes it a persistent source of risk. The Houthi attacks of recent years have demonstrated that risk in practice, forcing shipping companies to choose between danger and delay.

For students of geopolitics, Bab el-Mandeb offers a concentrated lesson in how geography, conflict, and commerce intersect. A body of water barely 26 kilometers wide shapes the flow of global trade and commands the attention of the world’s major powers. The ancient name endures for good reason: the Gate of Tears has brought grief to many who sought to pass through, and the dangers it poses are far from historical.

Sources & Further Reading¶

“The Influence of Sea Power upon History” by Alfred Thayer Mahan — The foundational text on maritime chokepoints and why control of narrow passages shapes global power, essential for understanding Bab el-Mandeb’s strategic logic.
“Yemen: The Unknown War” by Jean-Pierre Filiu — Provides critical context on the civil war that has transformed Bab el-Mandeb into an active conflict zone and explains the Houthi movement’s origins.
“The Red Sea: A History” by Alexis Ferraro — A comprehensive examination of the Red Sea corridor’s role in global commerce from ancient times to the present, situating Bab el-Mandeb within its broader regional context.
“Maritime Security in the Gulf of Aden and Red Sea” (RAND Corporation) — An analytical assessment of the security challenges facing shipping in the region, including piracy, terrorism, and state-based threats.