Strategic Autonomy

Strategic autonomy has become one of the defining concepts in contemporary geopolitical discourse, particularly within the European Union. At its core, the term describes the capacity of a state or political entity to pursue its interests and defend its values without being constrained by dependence on others. In a world of shifting power balances and uncertain alliances, the question of who can act independently—and at what cost—has moved to the center of strategic debate.

The concept gained particular urgency during the turbulent years from 2016 onward. Donald Trump’s questioning of NATO’s value during his 2016 campaign, his statement that he would encourage Russia to do “whatever the hell they want” to allies not meeting spending targets, and his administration’s abrupt policy shifts forced European leaders to confront uncomfortable questions about American reliability. Emmanuel Macron’s 2019 declaration that NATO was experiencing “brain death” and his call for European “strategic autonomy” articulated anxieties that had been building for years. The subsequent COVID-19 pandemic, Russia’s 2022 invasion of ukraine, and ongoing uncertainties about American political direction have only intensified these debates.

Defining Strategic Autonomy¶

The European External Action Service defines strategic autonomy as “the capacity to act autonomously when and where necessary and with partners wherever possible.” This formulation captures the concept’s essential tension: autonomy does not mean isolation or self-sufficiency, but rather the freedom to choose when to act alone and when to cooperate.

The 2016 EU Global Strategy introduced the term into official European discourse, calling for “an appropriate level of ambition and strategic autonomy” in security and defense. By 2020, the European Commission was speaking of “open strategic autonomy,” acknowledging that Europe would remain economically interdependent while seeking to reduce critical vulnerabilities. The semantic evolution reflects ongoing debates about how much autonomy is achievable or even desirable.

Strategic autonomy encompasses multiple dimensions:

Defense and security autonomy involves the ability to conduct military operations, defend territory, and project power without depending on another state’s forces, logistics, or command structures. For Europe, this has historically meant reducing reliance on American military capabilities while maintaining NATO’s collective defense. The European Union collectively spent approximately 240 billion euros on defense in 2023, compared to America’s $886 billion—yet European capabilities remain heavily dependent on American enablers including intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, aerial refueling, strategic transport, and integrated command systems.

Technological sovereignty addresses control over critical technologies: semiconductors, artificial intelligence, telecommunications infrastructure, space capabilities, and cyber systems. Digital sovereignty represents a key subset, concerning data governance, platform regulation, and cloud infrastructure. Europe’s dependence on American cloud providers (Amazon, Microsoft, Google control roughly 70% of the European cloud market), Taiwanese semiconductors (TSMC produces over 90% of advanced chips), and Chinese rare earth processing (over 85% of global capacity) illustrates the challenge’s magnitude.

Economic and energy independence involves resilient supply chains, diverse energy sources, and reduced vulnerability to external economic pressure. The COVID-19 pandemic and the Ukraine war dramatically highlighted Europe’s dependencies in pharmaceuticals (80% of active pharmaceutical ingredients came from China and India), semiconductors, and natural gas (before 2022, Russia supplied over 40% of EU gas imports). Germany’s Zeitenwende—the dramatic policy reversal announced in February 2022—acknowledged that decades of energy interdependence with Russia had created strategic vulnerability rather than political leverage.

Diplomatic autonomy means the freedom to pursue foreign policy objectives without external coercion. A state that cannot articulate positions at odds with a dominant partner lacks genuine strategic autonomy. The European Union’s inability to formulate coherent policies on issues from China to the Middle East reflects both internal divisions and external constraints.

Historical Evolution¶

The concept has roots in French strategic culture. Charles de Gaulle withdrew France from NATO’s integrated command in 1966 and pursued an independent nuclear deterrent precisely to preserve French freedom of action. France’s Force de Frappe, developed at enormous cost during the 1960s, gave Paris the ability to threaten unacceptable damage to any aggressor without American permission. The Gaullist tradition insists that a nation dependent on another for its security is not truly sovereign. De Gaulle’s famous dictum—“France cannot be France without grandeur”—implied that grandeur required independence.

The term gained broader European traction following the 1998 Saint-Malo Declaration, in which British Prime Minister Tony Blair and French President Jacques Chirac affirmed that the EU “must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces.” This marked a significant shift from assumptions that American security guarantees would suffice indefinitely. The declaration led to the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) and eventually the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), which has conducted over 40 civilian and military missions since 2003—though none approaching the scale or intensity of major conflicts.

Several subsequent developments accelerated interest in strategic autonomy:

The Iraq War (2003) divided Europe between supporters (UK, Spain, Italy, Poland) and opponents (France, Germany, Belgium) of American intervention, demonstrating that transatlantic relations could not be assumed. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld’s dismissive reference to “old Europe” and the bitter UN Security Council debates revealed fissures that had been papered over during the Cold War.

The 2008 financial crisis exposed European economic vulnerabilities and dependencies within the global financial system. The dollar’s centrality to global finance, demonstrated by the Federal Reserve’s emergency swap lines, underscored European dependence on American monetary policy decisions.

The Libya intervention (2011) provided a sobering demonstration of European military limitations. Though France and the UK led the operation, they quickly exhausted precision munitions and depended on American intelligence, aerial refueling, and logistics to sustain the campaign. As one US official reportedly remarked, “the allies ran out of bombs.” The gap between European ambition and capability was exposed.

The Trump administration (2017-2021) openly questioned NATO commitments and alliance value, prompting European leaders to consider scenarios in which American protection could not be guaranteed. Trump’s suggestion at a February 2024 rally that he would “encourage” Russia to do “whatever the hell they want” to NATO allies not meeting spending targets revived these concerns with renewed urgency.

COVID-19 and the Ukraine war crystallized supply chain vulnerabilities in health, energy, and technology, making abstract discussions of autonomy suddenly concrete. Europe discovered that 80% of its active pharmaceutical ingredients came from China and India, that mask production had largely moved to Asia, and that 40% of its gas came from a hostile power. The war revealed European dependence on American weapons systems—Javelin missiles, HIMARS rocket systems, Patriot batteries—to support Ukraine’s defense.

The European Debate¶

Strategic autonomy generates intense debate within Europe, with different member states bringing distinct historical experiences and strategic cultures:

France champions robust interpretation, arguing that Europe must develop independent military capabilities, domestic defense industry, and technological self-sufficiency. President Macron’s call for European “strategic autonomy” echoes the Gaullist tradition. France maintains the EU’s only independent nuclear deterrent (approximately 290 warheads), spends roughly 2% of GDP on defense (about 50 billion euros annually), and possesses power projection capabilities—aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle, amphibious assault ships, overseas bases—that most European allies lack. France has led military interventions in Mali (Operation Serval, 2013) and the Central African Republic without significant American participation, demonstrating at least limited autonomous capability.

Eastern European states—Poland, the Baltic nations, Romania—remain wary. Having experienced Soviet domination from 1945 to 1991, they prioritize the American security guarantee above European autonomy. Poland has committed to spending 4% of GDP on defense—the highest in NATO—explicitly to ensure American engagement. The Baltic states, with populations of only 1.3 million (Estonia), 1.9 million (Latvia), and 2.8 million (Lithuania), have no prospect of autonomous defense against Russian aggression. From their perspective, European strategic autonomy rhetoric risks undermining transatlantic bonds precisely when Russian threats are most acute. As Polish officials have bluntly stated: there is no European substitute for American Article 5 guarantees.

Germany traditionally occupied a middle position, supporting European capability development while emphasizing NATO primacy. The Zeitenwende announced by Chancellor Olaf Scholz on February 27, 2022—three days after Russia’s invasion—included a €100 billion special fund for Bundeswehr modernization and a commitment to sustained defense spending above 2% of GDP. Yet implementation has lagged: as of 2024, only a fraction of the special fund had been committed, procurement remains slow, and Germany’s defense industry faces capacity constraints. The purchase of American F-35 fighters to carry NATO’s nuclear sharing arrangements illustrated continuing dependence on American systems.

Smaller states often lack resources for autonomous action and depend on alliances for security. The Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark, and others contribute niche capabilities to NATO but cannot field balanced forces independently. For them, strategic autonomy is meaningful only as a collective European project—which requires the very coordination that European defense efforts have historically struggled to achieve.

The 2022 Strategic Compass attempted to forge consensus, outlining plans for a 5,000-strong Rapid Deployment Capacity by 2025, strengthened defense industry cooperation, and enhanced resilience. But implementation lags rhetoric. The Rapid Deployment Capacity would be smaller than a single US Army brigade; European defense industrial consolidation remains blocked by national interests; and fundamental questions about the relationship between European autonomy and NATO remain unresolved. EU defense spending, though rising, still totals only about one-quarter of American levels while supporting 27 separate national forces.

Autonomy Versus Alliance¶

A central tension animates the debate: does strategic autonomy strengthen or weaken alliance cohesion?

Proponents argue that greater European capabilities complement rather than compete with NATO. A more capable Europe reduces the American burden, provides options when American engagement is uncertain, and strengthens the alliance overall. Autonomy and alliance are not zero-sum.

Skeptics worry that autonomy initiatives duplicate resources, fragment command structures, and signal to Washington that Europeans are unreliable partners. If Europe hedges against American withdrawal, American withdrawal becomes more likely. The perception of weakened commitment may itself undermine deterrence.

Pragmatists note that complete autonomy is neither achievable nor desirable. European nations cannot match American intelligence capabilities, power projection assets, or nuclear arsenal. The question is not autonomy versus alliance but rather: which capabilities must Europeans develop independently, and which can rely on partners?

Beyond Europe: Global Perspectives¶

Strategic autonomy concerns extend well beyond Europe, with nations across the globe seeking to maximize freedom of action in an era of great power competition:

India has long pursued “strategic autonomy” (sometimes called multi-alignment), maintaining defense relationships with both Russia (historically supplying 60-70% of Indian military equipment) and the United States (with which India has signed foundational defense agreements since 2016) while avoiding binding alliance commitments. India continues purchasing Russian S-400 air defense systems despite American sanctions threats while simultaneously participating in the Quad and deepening defense ties with Washington. This approach reflects India’s size (1.4 billion people, $3.5 trillion GDP), regional aspirations, and historical non-alignment tradition dating to Jawaharlal Nehru. Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s statement that “this is not an era of war”—delivered to Vladimir Putin in September 2022—exemplified India’s determination to maintain relationships across the geopolitical divide.

Middle powers like Japan, Australia, South Korea, and Turkey navigate between great power patrons, seeking freedom of maneuver while recognizing security dependencies. Japan’s December 2022 National Security Strategy represents its most dramatic defense shift since 1945: doubling defense spending to 2% of GDP (approximately $80 billion annually) by 2027, acquiring counterstrike capabilities, and developing domestic defense production. Yet Japan remains fundamentally dependent on the US alliance—approximately 54,000 American troops stationed on Japanese soil provide the nuclear umbrella and extended deterrence that Japan’s constitution prevents it from developing independently. South Korea faces similar tensions: 28,500 US troops provide security guarantees against North Korea, but Seoul increasingly seeks technological and defense industrial autonomy.

The Global South increasingly frames strategic autonomy as resistance to great power pressure. BRICS expansion in 2024 (adding Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE) and the pursuit of alternative financial mechanisms reflect desire for independence from both Western and Chinese dominance. The New Development Bank, BRICS’ alternative to the World Bank, has approved over $33 billion in loans since 2015. Discussions of trading in local currencies rather than dollars—though limited in practice—signal aspiration to reduce dollar dependence. During the Ukraine conflict, major developing nations including India, Brazil, South Africa, and Indonesia refused to align with Western sanctions, demonstrating their determination to maintain policy independence.

China pursues its own version of strategic autonomy through “dual circulation” economic policy, domestic technology development, and reduced reliance on dollar-based systems. Beijing’s experience of American sanctions and technology restrictions—particularly the semiconductor export controls imposed in October 2022—has intensified self-reliance efforts. China’s “Made in China 2025” initiative targets 70% self-sufficiency in core components and materials; massive investments in semiconductor fabrication (over $140 billion committed through 2025) aim to reduce dependence on Taiwan and American technology. The internationalization of the renminbi, though still limited (roughly 2.5% of global payments versus the dollar’s 40%+), represents another dimension of Beijing’s quest to reduce strategic vulnerabilities created by American financial dominance.

Achieving Strategic Autonomy¶

Building genuine strategic autonomy requires sustained investment across multiple domains:

Defense capabilities include command-and-control systems, intelligence assets, logistics, precision munitions, air and missile defense, and power projection platforms. European dependence on American intelligence, transport aircraft, and aerial refueling represents significant gaps.

Industrial capacity means domestic or allied production of critical defense systems, avoiding dependencies on potential adversaries for components or raw materials. Europe’s defense industrial fragmentation—numerous small national champions rather than consolidated producers—limits efficiency.

Energy diversification involves reducing reliance on any single supplier, developing domestic renewable capacity, and building storage and interconnection infrastructure. The Ukraine war demonstrated how rapidly energy dependence can constrain policy options.

Technology sovereignty requires investment in semiconductors, AI, quantum computing, and other frontier technologies. The geoeconomic competition over technology makes this both more important and more difficult.

Skills and institutions encompass strategic planning capacity, military readiness, crisis management experience, and the political will to act. Capabilities matter little without the institutional infrastructure to employ them.

Costs and Trade-offs¶

Strategic autonomy carries real costs:

Financial burden of duplicate capabilities, domestic production premium, and sustained defense investment strains budgets. European nations have historically preferred welfare spending to defense.

Efficiency losses result from fragmented procurement, subscale production runs, and protection of national champions. A truly European defense industry would be more efficient but requires painful consolidation.

Alliance friction may increase if autonomy initiatives are perceived as hedging against partners. Managing American perceptions while building European capabilities requires diplomatic skill.

Technological trade-offs emerge when domestic production means accepting inferior or more expensive systems. Autonomy for its own sake may not be worth the capability cost.

Time horizons create urgency problems. Building autonomous capabilities takes decades; threats may materialize faster. The Ukraine war arrived before European strategic autonomy; NATO’s collective defense—centered on American power—provided the response.

The Future of Strategic Autonomy¶

Several trends will shape the concept’s evolution:

American politics will remain the key variable for European allies. Continued uncertainty about American commitments will sustain interest in autonomy; restored transatlantic confidence might dampen it.

Chinese power creates pressure for both greater autonomy and stronger alliances. The Indo-Pacific’s salience means European security increasingly connects to Asian dynamics.

Technology acceleration raises the stakes of technological dependence. Falling behind in AI, quantum, or semiconductors could compromise both economic competitiveness and military capability.

Climate and energy will reshape autonomy calculations as renewable transition changes energy geopolitics and extreme weather events stress national resilience.

Strategic autonomy will remain a contested concept because it touches fundamental questions: What does sovereignty mean in an interdependent world? How do states balance freedom of action against the benefits of alliance? When is dependence acceptable, and when does it become vulnerability? These questions have no permanent answers—only continuous recalibration as power shifts and circumstances change.

Sources & Further Reading¶

• The Grand Continent — European geopolitical journal that provides ongoing analysis of EU strategic autonomy debates, featuring leading European strategists and policymakers.

• Strategic Autonomy and the EU by Sven Biscop (Egmont Institute) — Concise policy analysis of what European strategic autonomy means in practice and the obstacles to achieving it.

• De Gaulle and the Anglo-Saxons by John Newhouse — Historical examination of Gaullist strategic thinking that established the intellectual foundations for European autonomy debates.

• The Art of Alliance Leadership by Michael Ruhle — Analysis of how NATO members balance alliance commitments with national autonomy, providing context for the autonomy-alliance tension.