On July 26, 1956, Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser addressed a crowd of 250,000 in Alexandria and announced the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company. The canal—100 miles long, linking the Mediterranean to the Red Sea, and carrying roughly two-thirds of Europe’s oil—had been operated since its opening in 1869 by a company dominated by British and French shareholders. Nasser’s seizure of the canal was an act of nationalist defiance that electrified the Arab world and enraged the European powers. Within three months, Britain, France, and Israel had secretly colluded to invade Egypt, retake the canal, and overthrow Nasser. Within a week of the invasion, the United States and the Soviet Union had forced the invaders to withdraw in humiliation.
The Suez Crisis is a hinge event in modern geopolitics—the moment when European imperial power died and superpower dominance was confirmed. For Britain, it marked the definitive end of the illusion that it could act as an independent great power without American approval. For France, it accelerated the turn toward European integration and the development of an independent nuclear deterrent. For the Arab world, it made Nasser a hero of anti-colonial resistance. For the Cold War, it demonstrated that the superpowers would enforce their dominance over their own allies when necessary. And for the international system, it established a precedent—that the use of force by colonial powers to preserve their interests would no longer be tolerated.
Background¶
Britain and the Canal¶
The Suez Canal, opened in 1869 and built by French engineer Ferdinand de Lesseps, had been the centerpiece of British imperial strategy for nearly a century. The canal reduced the sea route from London to Bombay from 10,800 miles (around the Cape of Good Hope) to 6,200 miles—a transformation that made British India economically viable and British naval dominance in the Indian Ocean possible.
Britain had purchased Egypt’s 44% share in the Suez Canal Company in 1875 (financed by the Rothschild banking house) and had occupied Egypt itself since 1882. British troops guarded the canal zone until their withdrawal in June 1956, just weeks before Nasser’s nationalization. For British Prime Minister Anthony Eden, the canal was not merely a waterway—it was a symbol of British power, and its loss would mean the end of Britain’s role as a global force.
Nasser’s Egypt¶
Nasser, who had overthrown the monarchy in 1952, embodied the forces reshaping the post-colonial world: Arab Nationalism, neutralism in the Cold War, and resistance to Western domination. His ambitions included building the Aswan High Dam to modernize Egypt’s agriculture—a project he hoped to finance with American and British aid.
When the United States withdrew its funding for the dam in July 1956—partly over Nasser’s recognition of Communist China and his arms deal with Czechoslovakia (a Soviet proxy)—Nasser retaliated by nationalizing the canal, declaring that canal revenues would fund the dam instead. “The Suez Canal belongs to us,” Nasser proclaimed. “It was built by the labor and lives of 120,000 Egyptians.”
The Conspiracy¶
Eden compared Nasser to Hitler and Mussolini—the “appeasement” analogy that would be invoked in every subsequent Western military intervention—and was determined to use force. But unilateral action required a pretext. The result was one of the most extraordinary episodes of diplomatic deception in modern history.
The Protocol of Sèvres¶
On October 22-24, 1956, British, French, and Israeli representatives met secretly at a villa in Sèvres, outside Paris, and agreed on a plan:
- Israel would invade Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula, advancing toward the canal
- Britain and France would issue an “ultimatum” demanding that both Egypt and Israel withdraw from the canal zone—knowing that Egypt, as the defending party, would refuse
- Anglo-French forces would then intervene as “peacekeepers” to “separate the combatants” and seize the canal
The plan was audacious in its cynicism. Israel attacked on October 29. The Anglo-French ultimatum followed on October 30—exactly as scripted. When Nasser predictably refused, British and French aircraft began bombing Egyptian airfields on October 31. Anglo-French paratroopers landed at Port Said on November 5, and seaborne forces followed on November 6.
The Crisis¶
Military Success, Political Catastrophe¶
The military operation succeeded. British and French forces captured Port Said and advanced along the canal. Israeli forces overran the Sinai in a brilliantly executed campaign. Egyptian military resistance crumbled.
But the political consequences were devastating:
American opposition: President Eisenhower was furious—not only at the invasion itself but at the fact that his closest allies had deceived him. The United States, which was simultaneously condemning the Soviet Union’s brutal suppression of the Hungarian Revolution, could not credibly oppose Soviet imperialism while tolerating Anglo-French imperialism. Eisenhower refused to support Britain at the UN and, critically, refused to support the British pound, which was collapsing under speculative pressure. Without American financial backing, Britain faced economic catastrophe.
Soviet threats: Soviet Premier Nikolai Bulganin sent letters to Britain, France, and Israel threatening rocket attacks—a threat that was largely bluff (Soviet forces were occupied in Hungary) but that concentrated minds in London and Paris.
UN condemnation: The General Assembly demanded a ceasefire by an overwhelming vote. The United States and Soviet Union found themselves on the same side—opposing European colonialism—for the first and perhaps only time during the Cold War.
Commonwealth revolt: Canada, under Prime Minister Lester Pearson, refused to support Britain and instead proposed the creation of a United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) to oversee the withdrawal—the first UN peacekeeping force in history.
The Withdrawal¶
On November 6—the same day Anglo-French forces completed their landings—Eden accepted a ceasefire. The decision was driven by three factors: American economic pressure (the Treasury warned that without American support for a loan from the International Monetary Fund, the pound would collapse), the lack of domestic support (the Labour opposition and a significant faction of Eden’s own Conservative Party opposed the invasion), and the realization that the operation could not succeed without American backing.
British and French forces withdrew by December 22. Israeli forces withdrew from the Sinai by March 1957, after securing guarantees of freedom of navigation through the Strait of Tiran. Eden resigned in January 1957, ostensibly for health reasons, his political career destroyed.
Consequences¶
The Death of European Imperial Power¶
Suez proved conclusively that Britain and France could no longer act as independent great powers. Without American support—or at least American acquiescence—significant military operations were impossible. The lesson was stark: the era of European dominance, stretching back to the Age of Exploration, was definitively over.
For Britain, Suez accelerated Decolonization. Harold Macmillan’s “wind of change” speech (1960) acknowledged the inevitability of African independence. Within a decade of Suez, Britain had withdrawn from most of its remaining colonial possessions. The “East of Suez” withdrawal (1968-1971) completed the process, ending Britain’s military presence in the Persian Gulf, Southeast Asia, and the Indian Ocean.
For France, Suez produced a different lesson. Charles de Gaulle, who returned to power in 1958, concluded that France must never again depend on the Anglo-American alliance. France developed its own nuclear weapons (first test 1960), withdrew from NATO’s military command (1966), and pursued an independent foreign policy designed to ensure French Sovereignty—a strategic orientation that persists to this day.
The Rise of Nasser¶
Nasser emerged from the crisis as the hero of Arab nationalism—the leader who had defied the colonial powers and won. His prestige soared across the Arab world. Egypt’s canal remained nationalized (and continued to operate efficiently, disproving British claims that Egyptians couldn’t manage it). Nasser’s model of Arab socialism, military modernization, and anti-Western resistance became the template for revolutionary movements across the Middle East and Africa.
The Precedent of UN Peacekeeping¶
Lester Pearson’s proposal for UNEF—a neutral international force to supervise the ceasefire and withdrawal—created a precedent that has shaped international conflict management ever since. Pearson received the Nobel Peace Prize for the initiative. UN peacekeeping, for all its limitations, became a standard tool for managing conflicts that the great powers could not resolve but wished to contain.
The American Dilemma¶
Eisenhower’s handling of Suez established the precedent that the United States would not tolerate independent military action by its allies when it conflicted with American interests. This principle—that the Western alliance operated under American leadership, not as a partnership of equals—has been tested repeatedly but never fundamentally altered. NATO operates, in practice, under American direction; European military operations require at minimum American logistical support and at maximum American political approval.
The irony is that Eisenhower’s principled stand against colonialism did not prevent the United States from undertaking its own imperial adventures. Within a decade, America would be deeply enmeshed in Vietnam—demonstrating that the lessons of Suez applied to others more clearly than to oneself.
Sources & Further Reading¶
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Suez: The Double War by Keith Kyle — The most comprehensive single-volume account, drawing on declassified British, French, and American archives to reconstruct the crisis in exhaustive detail.
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Suez 1956: The Inside Story of the First Oil War by Barry Turner — A compelling narrative focused on the oil dimension of the crisis and the economic pressures that ultimately forced British withdrawal.
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Ike’s Bluff: President Eisenhower’s Secret Battle to Save the World by Evan Thomas — Places Eisenhower’s Suez decisions within the broader context of his strategic thinking, including the nuclear dimension.
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No End of a Lesson: The Story of Suez by Anthony Nutting — Written by the British Minister of State who resigned over the conspiracy, providing an insider’s account of the Eden government’s decision-making.