The Balkans

The Balkans have earned their reputation as Europe’s “powder keg”—the region where the assassination of an Austrian archduke triggered World War I, where ethnic conflicts in the 1990s produced Europe’s worst violence since 1945, and where great power rivalries continue to simmer. Understanding why this peninsula generates such persistent instability requires understanding its geography, history, and the unresolved tensions that define it.

The region comprises approximately 550,000 square kilometers with a combined population of roughly 55 million people. It includes Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro, Kosovo, North Macedonia, Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, and portions of Romania and Turkey. GDP across the Western Balkans (excluding EU members) totals approximately $130 billion—less than the economy of Hungary alone—highlighting the economic underdevelopment that fuels emigration and instability.

Geographic Character¶

The Mountains¶

The Balkans are defined by mountains. The name itself derives from the Turkish word for “mountain,” and no other European region is so thoroughly dominated by rugged terrain:

The Dinaric Alps run 645 kilometers along the Adriatic coast, rising to 2,694 meters at Maja Jezercë
The Balkan Mountains (Stara Planina) cross Bulgaria for 560 kilometers, historically dividing the peninsula north and south
The Pindus range forms the spine of Greece, creating the isolation that allowed distinct city-states to flourish in antiquity
The Carpathians arc around the northern edge, separating the Balkans from the Hungarian Plain
The Rhodope Mountains along the Greek-Bulgarian border contain some of Europe’s oldest forests and most isolated communities

This terrain creates conditions fundamentally different from the great European plains:

Natural barriers separate communities, allowing distinct ethnic and religious identities to persist
Conquest and integration become enormously difficult—armies that conquered the plains struggled in the mountains
Economic isolation and underdevelopment follow from poor transportation links
Defensible positions enable resistance movements to survive—from medieval rebels to World War II partisans to 1990s militias

The mountains explain why the Balkans have never unified politically. The Heartland was defined by its flatness; the Balkans are its antithesis.

The Crossroads¶

The region sits at the intersection of civilizations:

West and East: Latin Christianity meets Eastern Orthodoxy along a line running through Bosnia and Croatia
Europe and Asia: The peninsula forms the land bridge connecting the continents
Christian and Islamic: Five centuries of Ottoman rule left significant Muslim communities among the Bosniaks (approximately 2 million), Albanians (5-6 million), and others
Sea and land powers: The region offers access to the Mediterranean, Aegean, Adriatic, and Black Sea

Every major empire has sought to control or influence this crossroads—Romans, Byzantines, Ottomans, Habsburgs, and in the 20th century, Nazis and Soviets. The strategic value persists: NATO bases in Kosovo (Camp Bondsteel, with 7,000 troops) and the importance of the Adriatic for projecting power into the Mediterranean demonstrate continuing military significance.

Strategic Waterways¶

Several critical passages pass through or near the Balkans:

The Bosphorus and Dardanelles (Turkish Straits) linking the Black Sea to the Mediterranean—Russia’s only warm-water access to global oceans
The Adriatic Sea route providing Central European access to the Mediterranean; the port of Trieste handles 62 million tons annually
The Danube River connecting Germany to the Black Sea across 2,850 kilometers, navigable for 2,400 kilometers and handling 40 million tons of freight yearly
The Vardar-Morava corridor linking the Aegean to Central Europe—the route of the ancient Via Militaris and modern rail connections

Control of these routes has driven centuries of competition. The Rimland theory of Nicholas Spykman identifies exactly these coastal and riverine zones as decisive for world power.

Historical Layers¶

The Roman Legacy¶

The Balkans were divided by the Roman Empire in 285 CE when Diocletian established the administrative split between East and West:

The Latin West (Croatia, Slovenia, and parts of Bosnia) looked toward Rome, adopted the Latin alphabet, and eventually embraced Catholicism
The Greek East (Serbia, Bulgaria, Greece, Macedonia) looked toward Constantinople, adopted Cyrillic script, and followed Orthodox Christianity
This division persists in religious and cultural orientation—it is visible today in the alphabets used, the churches attended, and the external powers each nation aligns with

The line between Catholic and Orthodox Europe runs through the Balkans, making the region a permanent fault line between civilizations.

The Byzantine-Ottoman Succession¶

Byzantium ruled the eastern Balkans for a millennium, then the Ottoman Empire dominated for five centuries (1389-1878 in most territories):

Orthodox Christianity became intertwined with political identity—the Serbian Orthodox Church preserved national consciousness during Ottoman rule
The Ottoman millet system organized populations by religion rather than ethnicity, creating communities that did not correspond to future nation-states
Muslim communities emerged through conversion: Bosniaks (today 2 million), Albanians (most of 5-6 million), Pomaks, and others
The “Eastern Question”—what happens as Ottoman power declines—shaped European diplomacy from 1774 to 1923

The Congress of Berlin (1878) formalized Ottoman retreat and created the modern Balkan state system, but its borders satisfied no one completely.

The National Awakening¶

The 19th and 20th centuries brought nationalism to a region entirely unsuited to it:

Greece achieved independence (1832) after a war that drew Romantic sympathy across Europe—Lord Byron died at Missolonghi
Serbia gained autonomy (1817) and independence (1878), claiming to represent all South Slavs
Romania, Bulgaria, and Montenegro followed, each with irredentist claims to territories held by others
Albania declared independence (1912) only after the Balkan Wars had already begun

Each new nation-state contained minorities and claimed territories held by others. No borders could have satisfied competing nationalisms based on ethnicity, history, religion, and strategic convenience. The Balkans became a laboratory for the balance of power—and its failures.

The Balkan Wars (1912-1913) expelled the Ottomans from Europe but created new grievances. Bulgaria lost territories it considered Bulgarian; Serbia doubled in size but was blocked from the Adriatic. These frustrations contributed directly to the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo on June 28, 1914—the spark that ignited World War I.

The Yugoslav Experiment¶

The South Slavs united in Yugoslavia (1918-1991), an attempt to transcend the region’s divisions:

Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Bosniaks, Montenegrins, and Macedonians brought together in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes (renamed Yugoslavia in 1929)
Interwar kingdom dominated by Serbia, resented by others
World War II occupation produced genocide (Croatian Ustasha killed hundreds of thousands of Serbs) and resistance (Tito’s communist Partisans)
Tito’s communist federation (1945-1980) maintained unity through authoritarianism, development, and careful ethnic balancing—rotating leadership, proportional representation, federal autonomy
After Tito’s death, economic crisis and rising nationalism eroded federal cohesion
Collapsed violently when communist control ended and Slobodan Milosevic exploited Serbian nationalism

The 1990s Wars¶

The Breakup¶

Yugoslavia’s dissolution produced Europe’s worst conflict since World War II. The sequence of violence escalated over nearly a decade:

Slovenia (June-July 1991): A ten-day war with approximately 70 casualties; Slovenia’s ethnic homogeneity and distance from Serbia enabled quick independence
Croatia (1991-95): The Croatian War of Independence killed approximately 20,000. Croatian Serbs, backed by the Yugoslav People’s Army, established the Republika Srpska Krajina. Operation Storm (August 1995) reconquered the territory, displacing 200,000 Serbs
Bosnia (1992-95): The most devastating conflict. Bosnian Serb forces, armed by Belgrade, besieged Sarajevo for 1,425 days—the longest siege in modern warfare. The Srebrenica massacre (July 1995) killed over 8,000 Bosniak men and boys in Europe’s worst atrocity since World War II. The war ended with the Dayton Accords after approximately 100,000 deaths
Kosovo (1998-99): Serbian security forces’ campaign against the Kosovo Liberation Army escalated to ethnic cleansing. NATO’s 78-day bombing campaign forced Serbian withdrawal. Approximately 13,000 died; 1.5 million were displaced

Across all conflicts, approximately 140,000 died; 4 million became refugees or internally displaced persons. The economic damage exceeded $100 billion.

International Response¶

The wars drew in outside powers, establishing precedents that shape international relations today:

United Nations: UNPROFOR deployed 38,000 peacekeepers, but rules of engagement prevented them from stopping atrocities. The failure at Srebrenica—Dutch peacekeepers handed over refugees who were then massacred—haunts international peacekeeping
NATO: Bombing campaigns against Bosnian Serbs (Operation Deliberate Force, 1995) and Serbia itself (Operation Allied Force, 1999) demonstrated alliance capability but occurred without UN Security Council authorization—Russia has cited Kosovo ever since to justify its own interventions
European Union: The EU’s failure to prevent war on its doorstep accelerated Common Foreign and Security Policy development; post-war stabilization included peacekeeping missions and the promise of eventual membership
Russia: Support for Serbia deepened Orthodox and Slavic solidarity; resentment of NATO intervention without UN approval became a foundational grievance in Moscow’s worldview

The interventions established precedents—humanitarian intervention without Security Council approval, containment of regional conflicts, the limits of negotiation with ethno-nationalist leaders—and grievances that persist three decades later.

Unresolved Issues¶

The 1990s settlements stopped the killing but did not resolve underlying issues:

Bosnia-Herzegovina: The Dayton structure divides the country into the Federation (Bosniak-Croat, 51% of territory) and Republika Srpska (Serb, 49%), plus the Brčko District. A rotating presidency, ethnic quotas, and entity vetoes produce paralysis. The state budget is approximately $6 billion but requires international oversight. Republika Srpska leader Milorad Dodik regularly threatens secession
Kosovo: Declared independence February 17, 2008; recognized by 104 UN members including the US, UK, France, and Germany; rejected by Serbia, Russia, China, Spain, and others. Population 1.8 million (92% Albanian); GDP approximately $9 billion. The north remains effectively controlled by Serbia. Kosovo Force (KFOR) maintains 3,800 NATO troops
North Macedonia: The Prespa Agreement (2018) resolved the name dispute with Greece (which objected to “Macedonia” implying claims on its northern province). But Bulgaria now blocks EU accession, demanding recognition that the Macedonian language is a Bulgarian dialect and that historical figures were Bulgarian. EU enlargement fatigue compounds the problem
Serbia: Population 6.7 million; GDP approximately $65 billion. Refuses to recognize Kosovo independence—constitutionally defined as part of Serbia. Torn between EU aspirations (membership negotiations opened in 2014) and Russian affinity (cultural, religious, and strategic). Maintains free trade agreement with Russia despite sanctions pressure

The region is stable compared to the 1990s but not fully at peace. Approximately 20,000 NATO and EU troops remain deployed.

Great Power Competition¶

The Balkans remain contested terrain where Russia, the West, China, and Turkey compete for influence—a 21st-century version of the 19th-century balance of power struggles.

Western Integration¶

The European Union and NATO have sought to incorporate the Balkans through the prospect of membership—the most successful foreign policy tool in EU history:

Slovenia: EU and NATO member since 2004; GDP per capita $31,000 (above EU average); fully integrated
Croatia: EU member since 2013; NATO since 2009; eurozone and Schengen since 2023; GDP per capita $20,000
Albania: NATO member since 2009; EU candidate since 2014; population 2.8 million; GDP $22 billion; negotiations opened 2022
Montenegro: NATO member since 2017; EU candidate; population 620,000; GDP $7 billion; most advanced in accession process
North Macedonia: NATO member since 2020 after name change; EU accession blocked by Bulgaria
Serbia, Bosnia, Kosovo: At various stages—Serbia opened negotiations 2014, Bosnia candidate since 2022, Kosovo applied 2022

The theory: integration brings stability, democracy, and prosperity. The evidence from Slovenia and Croatia supports this. But EU enlargement fatigue, Brexit, and internal EU crises have slowed momentum. The Western Balkans have been “waiting in the anteroom” for twenty years.

Russian Influence¶

Russia maintains influence despite limited economic weight (Russia-Western Balkans trade is approximately $5 billion annually versus EU trade exceeding $50 billion):

Serbia: The anchor of Russian influence. Historical ties date to 19th-century pan-Slavism; religious ties through shared Orthodoxy; political ties through shared grievance over NATO bombing in 1999. Russia has blocked Kosovo’s UN membership. Serbia maintains free trade with Russia, did not impose sanctions after Ukraine invasion, and hosts Russian cultural centers and media. Russian-Serbian military exercises occur regularly despite EU pressure
Republika Srpska: Russian support for the Serb entity within Bosnia. Dodik visited Moscow repeatedly and received investments. Russia blocked UN resolutions on Srebrenica commemoration. Some analysts see RS as potential Russian leverage to destabilize Bosnia and demonstrate Western impotence
Montenegro: Attempted coup in 2016 allegedly involved Russian intelligence officers; Montenegro joined NATO anyway (2017). Russian property investments (approximately 30% of coastal real estate) create economic interests. The Orthodox Church split parallels Russian influence in religious affairs
Energy: Serbia, North Macedonia, and Bosnia depend significantly on Russian gas. TurkStream pipeline crosses Serbia, creating infrastructure lock-in. Energy vulnerability limits foreign policy independence

Moscow views the Balkans as an arena to contest Western expansion and demonstrate that NATO/EU enlargement creates problems, not solutions.

Turkish Engagement¶

Turkey has substantially increased its regional role under Erdogan’s “neo-Ottoman” foreign policy:

Ottoman legacy provides cultural and religious ties—five centuries of shared history
Connections with Muslim communities: 8 million Bosniaks, Albanians, and others
Turkish development agency TIKA has invested over $1 billion in the Balkans since 2005
Trade between Turkey and Western Balkans exceeds $5 billion annually
Turkish Airlines connects Balkan capitals to global networks
Religious infrastructure: Turkey has funded mosque construction and restoration throughout the region
Occasional competition with both EU and Russia—Turkey offers an alternative model of modernization

Chinese Investment¶

China’s Belt and Road Initiative has reached the Balkans, making the region a foothold for Chinese influence in Europe:

Serbia: The most significant Chinese partner. Belgrade-Budapest railway ($3.5 billion, Chinese financing), Smederevo steel mill ($46 million purchase, now profitable), Zijin copper mine ($474 million), surveillance equipment in Belgrade, and potential 5G contracts with Huawei. Chinese investments in Serbia exceed $10 billion
Montenegro: The Bar-Boljare highway ($1.5 billion, Chinese loan) created debt concerns—85% of GDP—that the EU helped restructure
North Macedonia: Industrial development zones; infrastructure projects
Ports: Piraeus (Greece) is now Chinese-controlled; potential expansion of port investments into the Adriatic

Chinese investment offers infrastructure without political conditionality—no democracy requirements, no rule-of-law reforms. This complicates EU accession (governance concerns) while providing alternatives to Western financing. The EU has responded with the Global Gateway initiative, but Chinese financing remains attractive to governments seeking visible projects without reform requirements.

Contemporary Dynamics¶

Serbia: The Pivotal State¶

Serbia remains the region’s largest and most contested country—the fulcrum on which Balkan stability turns:

Kosovo issue: Recognition would technically open the path to EU accession but remains domestically unacceptable. Article 182 of Serbia’s constitution defines Kosovo as an “integral part of Serbia.” Opinion polls show 85%+ opposition to recognition. No Serbian government could survive recognition—or wants to
Russian relations: Serbia received S-400 missile system components (though not the full system); hosts the Russian-Serbian Humanitarian Center in Niš (critics call it a spy base); did not impose sanctions after Ukraine invasion; Vučić met Putin repeatedly even during wartime
Regional influence: Support for Republika Srpska’s Dodik; tensions with Croatia over Ustasha legacy; concerns among neighbors about “Greater Serbia” rhetoric
Vučić government: President Aleksandar Vučić has centralized power since 2012, controlling media, pressuring opposition, and winning elections by large margins. Serbia’s democracy scores have declined steadily on Freedom House and other indices. Vučić balances East and West, extracting benefits from both while committing to neither
Economy: GDP approximately $65 billion; 6.7 million population (down from 7.5 million in 2000 due to emigration); unemployment officially 9% but higher in practice; average salary approximately $800/month

Serbia’s choices will shape the region’s trajectory. If Serbia turns definitively toward Russia or China, Western Balkans integration fails. If Serbia accepts Kosovo normalization, the region could stabilize. Neither appears imminent.

Bosnia’s Fragility¶

Bosnia-Herzegovina remains Europe’s most fragile state—a country that functions primarily because international pressure prevents its dissolution:

Dayton structure: The 1995 settlement created two entities (Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Republika Srpska) plus Brčko District, with a weak central government. A three-person rotating presidency (one Bosniak, one Croat, one Serb), entity vetoes, and ethnic quotas produce paralysis. Basic legislation takes years. Constitutional reform requires consensus that does not exist
Serb separatism: Republika Srpska leader Milorad Dodik has systematically challenged state authority since 2014—withdrawing from state institutions, creating parallel structures, announcing referendums on independence. The RS has its own flag, anthem, holiday (January 9, ruled unconstitutional), and increasingly its own foreign policy (Dodik visits Moscow regularly)
Croat grievances: Bosnian Croats complain of underrepresentation and seek a third entity; Croatia proper supports these demands, complicating EU accession negotiations
Ethnic division: Institutionalized in constitution and politics. School systems are segregated. Political parties are ethnic. Employment follows ethnic quotas. Young people emigrate rather than navigate this system—Bosnia has lost 20% of its population since 1995
International presence: The Office of the High Representative (OHR) retains “Bonn Powers” to impose legislation and remove officials, last used significantly in 2021 to criminalize genocide denial. EUFOR maintains 1,100 troops. Without international presence, violence would likely resume

Kosovo’s Limbo¶

Kosovo’s status remains internationally contested, creating a frozen conflict in the heart of Europe:

Independence: Declared February 17, 2008. Recognized by 104 UN members including the United States, United Kingdom, France, and Germany. The International Court of Justice ruled (2010) that the declaration did not violate international law
Non-recognition: Serbia, Russia, China, Spain (fearing Catalan precedent), Greece, Slovakia, Cyprus, and approximately 90 other states refuse recognition. This blocks UN membership, limits economic development, and leaves Kosovo’s 1.8 million citizens with restricted travel documents
Internal challenges: GDP approximately $9 billion; 17% unemployment (50% among youth); corruption endemic; energy supply unreliable; rule of law weak
Serbia normalization: EU-facilitated dialogue since 2011 has produced technical agreements (license plates, customs, telecommunications) but no political breakthrough. The 2023 Ohrid Agreement Framework remains unimplemented. Northern Kosovo (4 Serb-majority municipalities, approximately 50,000 people) remains functionally controlled by Belgrade
International presence: KFOR (NATO-led, 3,800 troops) and EULEX (EU rule of law mission) maintain stability

North Macedonia’s Progress¶

North Macedonia resolved its name dispute with Greece through the Prespa Agreement (2018) and joined NATO (2020):

Demonstrates that Balkan problems can be solved through diplomacy—ending a 27-year dispute
Prime Minister Zoran Zaev took political risks; voters initially rejected the agreement in a referendum (insufficient turnout invalidated it); parliament ratified anyway
But EU accession now blocked by Bulgaria, which demands recognition that Macedonian language and historical figures were Bulgarian. Bulgaria vetoed accession negotiations in 2020
Constitutional amendments required by Bulgaria have not been implemented; nationalist backlash threatens to unravel the Prespa Agreement
Shows the limits of EU’s transformative power—accession conditionality works only if accession appears achievable

Structural Challenges¶

Economic Underdevelopment¶

The Western Balkans lag dramatically behind European averages:

GDP per capita: Albania $7,500; Serbia $10,000; North Macedonia $7,000; Bosnia $8,000; Kosovo $5,500; Montenegro $11,000. Compare to EU average $38,000, or neighboring Slovenia $31,000 and Croatia $20,000
Youth unemployment: 25-50% across the region—Kosovo (50%), North Macedonia (35%), Bosnia (33%), Serbia (26%), Albania (26%)
Brain drain: The region has lost an estimated 2-3 million people since 1990 to emigration. Bosnia’s population dropped from 4.4 million (1991) to 3.2 million (2023). Kosovo loses 30,000 young people annually. Remittances exceed 10% of GDP in Kosovo and Albania
Corruption: Transparency International scores range from 36 (Albania) to 45 (Montenegro) out of 100. Rule of law indices show persistent weakness. Organized crime remains significant—drug trafficking, arms smuggling, human trafficking
Infrastructure: Transport links remain underdeveloped; energy supply unreliable; digital connectivity lags. The region has received substantial EU funding (approximately $3 billion annually) but absorption capacity is limited

Democratic Backsliding¶

Several countries have experienced authoritarian drift, raising questions about the EU’s transformative power:

Serbia under Vučić: Press freedom declined sharply (Serbia ranks 91st globally); opposition protests met with violence (2023); elections criticized by OSCE monitors; judiciary lacks independence; Vučić controls most television
Republika Srpska under Dodik: Systematic destruction of state institutions; creation of parallel structures; intimidation of journalists; cooperation with Russian intelligence alleged
Albania under Rama: Media captured; opposition boycotted parliament (2019); justice reform implemented but concerns about selective application
Montenegro: Political crisis since 2020; fragile coalition governments; Orthodox Church divisions; concerns about organized crime influence in politics
Kosovo: Relatively pluralistic but weak institutions; corruption endemic; political violence (rare but occurring)

Ethnic Tensions¶

Inter-ethnic relations remain fraught, a generation after the wars:

Memory of 1990s violence: Survivors are still alive; mass graves still being discovered; war criminals still venerated in some communities
Nationalist rhetoric: Politicians across the region routinely exploit ethnic grievances for electoral advantage. Dodik denies Srebrenica genocide. Croatian officials attend Ustasha commemorations. Kosovo Albanian politicians invoke Serbian oppression
Divided systems: Schools in Bosnia teach different histories to different ethnicities—sometimes in the same building. Media ecosystems are ethnic. Social segregation persists
Periodic incidents: License plate disputes at the Kosovo-Serbia border (2021, 2022); clashes in northern Kosovo (2023); Republika Srpska mobilization threats; Croatian-Serbian diplomatic rows

Future Scenarios¶

Successful Integration¶

The optimistic scenario: - EU accession process continues and eventually succeeds - Economic development reduces grievances - Kosovo-Serbia normalization achieved - Democratic governance consolidates

This would require EU commitment that is currently uncertain.

Frozen Instability¶

The muddling-through scenario: - Current dynamics continue indefinitely - Neither full integration nor renewed conflict - Periodic crises managed without resolution - Region remains in European periphery

This is the most likely near-term outcome.

Renewed Conflict¶

The pessimistic scenario: - Bosnia fragments; Republika Srpska secedes - Kosovo-Serbia tensions escalate - Great power competition intensifies - Violence returns to the region

This cannot be ruled out, particularly if international attention wanes.

Conclusion¶

The Balkans illustrate how geography shapes politics. Mountains that divide communities, crossroads that attract empires, borders that cut across ethnic groups—these physical realities have produced centuries of conflict and continue to generate instability.

The region matters beyond its size because of what it represents: the challenge of managing diversity, the limits of international intervention, the persistence of ethnic nationalism, and the continuing relevance of great power competition in Europe.

Understanding the Balkans provides insight into some of the most difficult questions in international relations: Can diverse populations share states? Can outside powers stabilize conflict zones? Can history’s wounds heal? The answers remain uncertain, and the Balkans remain, as they have been, a laboratory for the possibilities and limits of political order.

Sources & Further Reading¶

“The Balkans: Nationalism, War, and the Great Powers, 1804-2012” by Misha Glenny — The essential modern history, tracing how the region became “Europe’s powder keg” and why it remains unstable.
“Balkan Ghosts: A Journey Through History” by Robert D. Kaplan — Influential travelogue that shaped American understanding of the region before the Yugoslav Wars, controversial but widely read.
“The Fall of Yugoslavia” by Misha Glenny — Authoritative account of the 1990s wars from the journalist who covered them, explaining how Yugoslavia disintegrated into violence.
“The Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914” by Christopher Clark — Demonstrates how Balkan conflicts triggered World War I, illuminating the region’s capacity to destabilize Europe.
“Bosnia: A Short History” by Noel Malcolm — Essential background on the most complex of the Yugoslav successor states and why its divisions remain so difficult to overcome.