The Middle East

The Strategic Crossroads

The Middle East is the most persistently unstable region in the modern world. Wars, revolutions, coups, and crises have defined its recent history, while great powers have repeatedly intervened in pursuit of strategic interests. Understanding the Middle East requires understanding it as a geopolitical system—a region where geography, resources, religion, and external intervention combine to produce structural instability.

The region encompasses approximately 7 million square kilometers—depending on definitions, which vary from the “core” Arab world to broader constructions including Turkey, Iran, and North Africa. Population exceeds 400 million, with the largest countries being Egypt (105 million), Iran (88 million), Turkey (85 million), and Iraq (44 million). Combined GDP approaches $4 trillion, but distribution is wildly uneven: Qatar’s per capita income ($87,000) is 50 times Yemen’s ($1,500). This economic disparity—driven by the accident of hydrocarbon geography—shapes every aspect of regional politics.

Geographic Character

The Crossroads

The Middle East sits at the junction of Europe, Asia, and Africa:

  • The land bridge connecting three continents: armies from Alexander to the Crusaders to the Mongols to the Ottomans to the British all marched through
  • Maritime passages linking the Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean: 12% of global trade transits the Suez Canal; 21% of global oil moves through the Strait of Hormuz
  • Historical trade routes passing through: the Incense Route, the Silk Road’s western terminus, the hajj routes—commerce and pilgrimage shaped the region for millennia
  • Every major empire has sought to control this crossroads: Persian, Greek, Roman, Byzantine, Arab, Ottoman, British, and American

Geography makes the region strategically central regardless of what resources lie beneath it. The Middle East would matter even without oil.

The Arid Zone

The region is defined by aridity that constrains all human activity:

  • Most territory receives less than 250mm of rainfall annually—the threshold for rain-fed agriculture. The Arabian Peninsula averages 100mm; the Sahara, less than 25mm
  • Water is scarce and contested: the Nile (shared by 11 countries), the Tigris-Euphrates (Turkey, Syria, Iraq), and the Jordan River (Israel, Jordan, Palestinians) all face allocation disputes
  • Populations concentrate along rivers and coasts: 95% of Egyptians live within 20 kilometers of the Nile; the Fertile Crescent (from Iraq through Syria to the Mediterranean) remains the agricultural heartland
  • Agriculture depends on irrigation: the Middle East has 5% of world population but only 1% of freshwater resources

Water scarcity creates structural tensions that climate change will worsen. The 2007-2010 Syrian drought—the worst in 900 years—displaced 1.5 million farmers and contributed to the conditions that produced civil war.

Critical Chokepoints

Several of the world’s most important maritime passages concentrate in the Middle East:

  • strait-of-hormuz: 21% of global oil consumption (18-21 million barrels per day) and 25% of global LNG transits this 33-kilometer-wide passage. Iran could theoretically close it with mines and missiles—the “Hormuz hostage”
  • suez-canal: 12-15% of world trade (1.3 billion tons annually) passes through this 193-kilometer canal. The Ever Given blockage (2021) cost global trade $9.6 billion per day. Yemen’s Houthi attacks (2023-2024) diverted significant traffic
  • Bab el-Mandeb: The 26-kilometer strait between Yemen and Djibouti controls Red Sea access. 6.2 million barrels of oil transit daily; Houthi missile and drone attacks have demonstrated its vulnerability
  • Turkish Straits: Russia’s only access from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean. 48,000 vessels transit annually; Turkey controls passage under the Montreux Convention (1936)

Control over these chokepoints confers outsized strategic importance—and the ability to disrupt global trade provides leverage to even minor regional actors.

The Oil Factor

Geographic Concentration

The Middle East contains the world’s largest concentration of hydrocarbon resources—the single most important fact about the region’s global significance:

  • 836 billion barrels of proven oil reserves (48% of global total)—enough to supply the world for 50 years at current consumption
  • 80 trillion cubic meters of proven natural gas (38% of global total)
  • Production costs of $5-15 per barrel versus $30-50 for US shale or $50+ for deepwater offshore—the world’s lowest-cost production
  • Five of the world’s six largest oil reserves: Saudi Arabia (297 billion barrels), Iran (208 billion), Iraq (145 billion), Kuwait (102 billion), UAE (97 billion)

This concentration makes the region’s stability a global concern regardless of any ideological or humanitarian considerations. When the United States declared the Persian Gulf a “vital national interest” (Carter Doctrine, 1980), it acknowledged geopolitical reality.

The Petro-States

Oil has fundamentally shaped political development, creating states unlike any in history:

  • Saudi Arabia: World’s swing producer with 12 million barrels per day capacity; proven reserves of 297 billion barrels; oil revenues ($250-300 billion annually) fund the entire state apparatus. The kingdom can influence global oil prices by adjusting production—a power no other country possesses
  • Iraq: 145 billion barrels of reserves; production of 4.5 million bpd before disruptions. Oil financed Saddam Hussein’s million-man army and wars against Iran (1980-88) and Kuwait (1990-91). Post-2003 oil revenues have fueled corruption on a staggering scale
  • Iran: 208 billion barrels plus the world’s second-largest gas reserves (34 trillion cubic meters). Sanctions since 1979—intensified since 2018—target oil exports, limiting production to 2.5-3.5 million bpd versus 6 million bpd potential
  • Kuwait: 102 billion barrels; 2.9 million bpd production; population of 4.3 million (70% foreign workers). Per capita income $35,000. Iraq’s invasion (1990) aimed to seize these reserves
  • UAE: 97 billion barrels; 3.2 million bpd production; population 9.9 million (90% foreign workers). Abu Dhabi’s reserves fund the federation; Dubai diversified into trade and tourism
  • Qatar: 25 billion barrels plus the world’s third-largest gas reserves (shared with Iran in the North Field). LNG exports make Qatar per capita the world’s richest nation ($87,000). This tiny country (population 2.9 million, 90% foreign) wields outsized influence

Oil creates wealth without requiring productive economies or accountable governance.

The Resource Curse

Hydrocarbon wealth correlates with governance pathologies that scholars call the “resource curse” or “rentier state” syndrome:

  • Authoritarian governance: States that can fund themselves through oil revenues have no need to tax citizens—and therefore no need to represent them. “No taxation, no representation”
  • Economic underdevelopment: The “Dutch disease” makes non-oil sectors uncompetitive; diversification fails. Oil accounts for 70-90% of government revenue in Gulf states
  • Inequality and social tension: Oil wealth concentrates among elites and in capital cities; peripheries remain poor. Distribution becomes politicized
  • External intervention: Great powers intervene to secure oil access—the Cold War in the Middle East, the Gulf Wars, continuing US presence
  • Corruption: Oil revenues provide vast funds for patronage; anticorruption institutions remain weak. Iraq has “lost” $150 billion since 2003 according to official estimates

The resource curse helps explain Middle Eastern politics—why democratization has failed, why development has lagged, why intervention continues.

Systemic Instability

The State System

The modern Middle Eastern state system emerged from imperial collapse and colonial partition—not organic political development:

  • Ottoman collapse: The empire that ruled most of the region (1517-1918) provided four centuries of relative stability. Sunni Arab, Shia Arab, Kurd, Armenian, Greek, and Jew coexisted under a system that organized society by religion (millet) rather than ethnicity. The empire’s destruction in World War I created a vacuum
  • Colonial partition: Britain and France divided Ottoman Arab territories through the Sykes-Picot Agreement (1916)—a secret deal between diplomats Mark Sykes and François Georges-Picot. Britain took Iraq, Palestine, and Transjordan; France took Syria and Lebanon. The agreement contradicted promises made to Arab leaders who had revolted against the Ottomans
  • Arbitrary borders: Lines drawn with minimal regard for ethnic or religious geography. Iraq combined Shia Arabs (60%), Sunni Arabs (20%), and Kurds (15-20%) who had no history as a single political unit. Lebanon combined Christians, Sunnis, Shia, and Druze in a fragile confessional balance
  • Artificial states: Iraq, Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon were created by external powers for external purposes. They had flags, borders, and UN seats—but lacked the organic legitimacy of nations that emerged from their own history

These origins left states with contested legitimacy that persists a century later.

Legitimacy Deficits

Middle Eastern governments face persistent legitimacy challenges that explain their fragility:

  • Monarchies: The Saudis, Hashemites (Jordan), Thani (Qatar), Khalifa (Bahrain), Nahyan/Maktoum (UAE), and Sabahs (Kuwait) struggle to justify hereditary rule in a democratic age. Performance legitimacy (services, stability, development) substitutes for democratic legitimacy
  • Republics: Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Algeria, Yemen—“republics” in name but authoritarian in practice. Presidential terms extend indefinitely; sons succeed fathers (Assad in Syria, planned in Egypt); elections are performative. Neither truly republican nor traditionally legitimate
  • Religious legitimacy: The Saudis claim guardianship of Mecca and Medina; Iran claims revolutionary Islamic credentials; ISIS claimed the caliphate (2014-2019). All are contested. Religion provides legitimation but also grounds for challenge
  • Nationalist legitimacy: Arab nationalism promised unity and strength; it delivered division and defeat (1948, 1967). Palestinian nationalism defines identity by dispossession. Kurdish nationalism remains unrealized. Nationalism mobilizes but does not stabilize

Weak legitimacy requires either repression or performance—often both. The security apparatus consumes 15-30% of government budgets in most Middle Eastern states.

The Security Dilemma

States face each other in mutual suspicion with no framework for managing competition:

  • No regional security architecture: Unlike Europe (NATO, OSCE) or Asia (ASEAN), the Middle East has no inclusive security organization. The Arab League is ineffective; the Gulf Cooperation Council excludes major powers
  • Historical rivalries and recent conflicts: Wars within living memory—Israel-Arab (1948, 1956, 1967, 1973), Iran-Iraq (1980-88), Gulf War (1990-91), Yemen (2015-present), Syria (2011-present)
  • Arms races and military buildups: Saudi Arabia spent $75 billion on defense in 2023 (6.8% of GDP); UAE $25 billion; Israel $24 billion. The region is the world’s leading arms importer
  • Alliances with external powers: Saudi Arabia and Gulf states rely on US security guarantees; Syria relies on Russia and Iran; Israel maintains its US alliance while building Gulf ties

The classic security dilemma operates intensely: one state’s defensive measures appear threatening to others, driving counter-measures that leave all less secure.

Regional Rivalries

Saudi-Iranian Competition

The defining regional rivalry—a cold war that periodically turns hot:

  • Sectarian dimension: Sunni Saudi Arabia (which controls Islam’s holiest sites) versus Shia Iran (which claims revolutionary leadership). Each supports co-religionists across the region: Saudi Arabia backs Sunnis; Iran supports Shia in Iraq (60% of population), Bahrain (70%), Lebanon (Hezbollah), and Yemen (Houthis)
  • Ideological dimension: Conservative monarchy (the House of Saud ruling an absolutist kingdom) versus revolutionary Islamic republic (which overthrew a monarchy in 1979 and exports its model). The Iranian Revolution directly threatened the legitimacy of Gulf monarchies
  • Geopolitical dimension: Arab leadership (Saudis claim to lead the Arab and Sunni worlds) versus Persian assertiveness (Iran, heir to 2,500 years of empire, refuses subordination). The Arab-Persian rivalry predates Islam
  • Proxy wars: Yemen (since 2015, 150,000+ dead), Syria (since 2011, 500,000+ dead), Iraq (political competition, militia activity), Lebanon (Hezbollah versus Saudi-backed factions), Bahrain (2011 uprising suppressed with Saudi troops)
  • The 2023 rapprochement: China brokered restoration of Saudi-Iranian diplomatic relations (March 2023)—a significant shift suggesting both powers may be exhausted by proxy conflict, or that US influence is declining sufficiently to enable accommodation

This rivalry structures much of regional politics—but may be evolving.

Arab-Israeli Conflict

The longest-running conflict in modern Middle Eastern history:

  • Origins: The 1948 war following Israel’s declaration of independence. Arab armies attacked; Israel prevailed; 700,000 Palestinians fled or were expelled (the Nakba). The Palestinian refugee population now exceeds 5.9 million
  • Wars: 1956 (Suez Crisis), 1967 (Six-Day War—Israel captured Sinai, Gaza, West Bank, Golan Heights), 1973 (Yom Kippur War), Lebanon invasions (1978, 1982, 2006), Gaza operations (2008-09, 2012, 2014, 2021, 2023-24)
  • Palestinian question: 5.5 million Palestinians live under Israeli occupation in the West Bank and Gaza; 2 million are Israeli citizens; millions more are refugees. Statelessness, occupation, and settlement expansion continue
  • Normalization: Egypt (1979) and Jordan (1994) made peace with Israel. The Abraham Accords (2020) added UAE, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan. Saudi normalization was reportedly close before October 2023
  • October 2023: Hamas’s attack (1,200 Israeli dead, 240 hostages) and Israel’s Gaza response (40,000+ Palestinian dead, massive destruction) transformed the conflict’s dynamics. The two-state solution appears more distant than ever

The conflict has become less central to Arab states’ foreign policies—but the October 2023 war demonstrated it remains capable of destabilizing the entire region.

Turkey’s Resurgence

Under Erdogan’s leadership (2003-present), Turkey has transformed from NATO-aligned secular republic to assertive regional power:

  • Neo-Ottoman rhetoric and ambitions: Erdogan invokes Ottoman greatness, claims leadership of Sunni Muslims, and projects power into former Ottoman territories
  • Interventions: Syria (Operation Euphrates Shield, Operation Olive Branch—controlling territory along the border); Libya (military support for UN-recognized government); Iraq (operations against PKK); Azerbaijan (decisive support in 2020 Karabakh war); Somalia, Qatar, and elsewhere
  • Military capability: NATO’s second-largest military (650,000 active personnel); domestically produced drones (Bayraktar TB2) that proved effective in Libya, Syria, and Ukraine; defense industry growing 30% annually
  • Tensions with traditional allies: S-400 purchase from Russia triggered US sanctions and F-35 expulsion; disputes with Greece over Aegean/Eastern Mediterranean; migration leverage over EU; Erdogan’s rhetoric against Israel
  • Competition: With Saudi Arabia and Egypt for Sunni leadership; with Iran for influence in Iraq and Syria; with Russia for influence in the Caucasus and Black Sea

Turkey adds another pole to regional competition—a middle power with great power ambitions.

External Intervention

Great Power History

External powers have repeatedly shaped the Middle East—intervention is the historical norm:

  • British and French empires: Created the modern state system through the Sykes-Picot Agreement, the Balfour Declaration (promising a Jewish homeland in Palestine, 1917), and League of Nations mandates. Britain controlled Iraq, Palestine, Transjordan, Egypt, and the Gulf states; France controlled Syria and Lebanon. This imperial order collapsed only in the 1950s-60s
  • Cold War superpowers: The Soviet Union armed Egypt, Syria, and Iraq; the United States supported Israel, Saudi Arabia, and (until 1979) Iran. The 1956 Suez Crisis marked British-French eclipse and American-Soviet dominance. Regional conflicts became superpower proxy wars
  • Post-Cold War America: The sole superpower. The Gulf War (1991) deployed 700,000 troops; the post-9/11 wars committed 2.5 million service members over 20 years; military bases in Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, UAE, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and elsewhere
  • Russia’s return: Military intervention in Syria (2015) restored Russian influence for the first time since the Cold War. Russia now operates bases at Tartus (naval) and Khmeimim (air), has demonstrated military capability, and engages diplomatically across the region

External intervention is the norm, not the exception. The Middle East has not determined its own political order in over a century.

American Presence

Since World War II, the United States has been the dominant external power, with commitments that expanded over decades:

  • Carter Doctrine (1980): “Any attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force”
  • First Gulf War (1991): 700,000 US and coalition troops reversed Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. Decisive victory in 100 hours demonstrated American military supremacy
  • Containment (1991-2001): No-fly zones over Iraq; sanctions; presence in Gulf states
  • Post-9/11 (2001-2021): Invasions of Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003) committed trillions of dollars and hundreds of thousands of troops. 7,000 US service members killed; estimates of 900,000 total deaths from post-9/11 wars
  • Current presence: 45,000-60,000 troops in the region (reduced from 90,000 in 2020); Fifth Fleet (Bahrain); air bases in Qatar, UAE, Kuwait, Jordan; advisors throughout; $150 billion in arms sales to region since 2009

American involvement is now questioned across the political spectrum. The Afghanistan withdrawal (2021), Iraq’s instability, and strategic competition with China have prompted “Middle East fatigue.”

Limits of Intervention

External powers face persistent challenges that Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrated:

  • Military force cannot create legitimate governance: The US deposed Saddam Hussein but could not build an Iraqi state. The Afghan government collapsed within days of US withdrawal after 20 years and $2 trillion
  • Occupation breeds resistance: Insurgencies in Iraq killed 4,500 Americans; in Afghanistan, 2,500. Populations do not accept foreign rule, regardless of stated intentions
  • Allies are often problematic: Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Gulf states are authoritarian; Israel’s policies toward Palestinians undermine American credibility; Turkey pursues independent policies
  • Exit strategies prove elusive: “Mission creep” extended every intervention. The 2003 Iraq invasion was supposed to be quick; US troops remained until 2011 (and returned in 2014). Afghanistan, entered in 2001, ended only in 2021
  • Unintended consequences multiply: The Iraq invasion empowered Iran; the Libya intervention (2011) produced state collapse; supporting Syrian opposition contributed to refugee flows that destabilized European politics

These limits do not prevent intervention—they ensure intervention produces disappointing results.

Regional Conflicts

Syria

The civil war that became a regional and global conflict—the Middle East’s disaster of the 2010s:

  • Origins: Popular uprising (March 2011) inspired by the Arab Spring. Assad regime responded with violence; peaceful protests became armed rebellion
  • Internationalization: Assad backed by Russia (air power, diplomatic protection) and Iran (ground forces, Hezbollah, Iraqi militias). Opposition backed by Gulf states, Turkey, and initially the West. Foreign fighters flooded in
  • ISIS: The Islamic State emerged from the chaos, declaring a caliphate (2014) and controlling territory across Syria and Iraq. A US-led coalition eventually defeated ISIS militarily (by 2019) but conditions that produced it persist
  • Consequences: Approximately 500,000-600,000 dead; 14 million displaced (6.8 million refugees, 7.2 million internally displaced); 90% of population in poverty; infrastructure destroyed; chemical weapons used multiple times
  • Current status: Assad survived with Russian and Iranian support; controls 70% of territory. Northeast Syria under Kurdish-led SDF (US-backed). Northwest (Idlib) held by Turkish-backed opposition. No political settlement in sight

Syria illustrates how local conflicts become internationalized—and how intervention by multiple powers prevents resolution.

Yemen

The forgotten war—a humanitarian catastrophe with no end:

  • Origins: Houthi movement (Zaydi Shia, northern Yemen) seized Sanaa (September 2014); Saudi-led coalition intervened (March 2015) to restore recognized government
  • Proxy dimensions: Saudi Arabia and UAE versus Iran-backed Houthis. But local dynamics matter more than external backing—Yemen’s conflict predates external involvement
  • Military situation: Despite $100+ billion in military spending and advanced weapons, the coalition failed to defeat Houthis. UAE-backed southern separatists complicate the picture further
  • Humanitarian catastrophe: 150,000+ conflict deaths; 227,000 total deaths (including disease and starvation); 21 million need humanitarian assistance (80% of population); world’s worst food crisis; cholera epidemic
  • Regional impact: Houthi drones and missiles strike Saudi Arabia; Houthi attacks on Red Sea shipping (2023-24) disrupted global trade; the conflict demonstrates limits of Gulf military power
  • Current status: Ceasefire (2022) brought reduction in violence; peace talks ongoing but fundamental issues unresolved

Yemen demonstrates the limits of military intervention and the scale of humanitarian consequences.

Iraq

The ongoing aftermath of American invasion—20+ years and still not stable:

  • Invasion (2003): Saddam Hussein overthrown in 21 days. But “Mission Accomplished” was premature—the occupation lasted years
  • Aftermath: De-Baathification and army dissolution created insurgency; sectarian civil war (2006-08) killed tens of thousands; US “surge” (2007) reduced violence temporarily
  • ISIS occupation: The Islamic State seized Mosul (2014) and declared its caliphate, ruling 10 million people. Liberation took three years and destroyed cities
  • Iranian influence: The US invasion eliminated Iran’s enemy (Saddam) and empowered Iran’s allies (Iraqi Shia parties). Iran-backed militias now wield significant power; Iranian influence in Baghdad is profound
  • Current status: Formally democratic but dysfunctional. Corruption endemic ($150 billion “lost” since 2003). Oil revenues fuel patronage but not development. Population 44 million; GDP $270 billion; 30% unemployment. Periodic protests; US troops (2,500) remain
  • Legacy: The Iraq War discredited American intervention, empowered Iran, destabilized the region, and cost $2+ trillion

Iraq shows how intervention can make things worse—and how long consequences persist.

Israel-Palestine

The conflict with no resolution—now in its eighth decade:

  • Historical layers: British Mandate (1920-48); Israel’s creation and 1948 war (700,000 Palestinian refugees); 1967 war (occupation of West Bank and Gaza); intifadas (1987-93, 2000-05); peace process (Oslo Accords, 1993-2000) that failed
  • Occupation: 3 million Palestinians live in the West Bank under Israeli military occupation since 1967. 700,000+ Israeli settlers in East Jerusalem and West Bank settlements, expanding annually
  • Gaza: 2.3 million Palestinians in 365 square kilometers—one of world’s most densely populated areas. Hamas rule since 2007; Israeli-Egyptian blockade since then. Periodic wars (2008, 2012, 2014, 2021, 2023-24)
  • October 2023: Hamas attack killed 1,200 Israelis; Israel’s response killed 40,000+ Palestinians, destroyed 70%+ of Gaza’s housing, and displaced 90% of population. The most destructive episode since 1948
  • Two-state solution: Endorsed by international community for decades but never implemented. Settlement expansion, Palestinian division, and Israeli politics make it increasingly unfeasible
  • Current trajectory: No negotiations; no path visible; violence episodic but recurring; international attention fluctuating

No party sees a path to resolution—and the conflict’s ability to destabilize the region was demonstrated again in 2023-24.

Structural Factors

Demography

Population dynamics create pressures that no political system has successfully addressed:

  • Young populations: Median ages in the 20s across much of the region—Egypt (24), Iraq (21), Yemen (19), Saudi Arabia (32). 65% of the region’s population is under 30. This “youth bulge” has driven every major political upheaval, from the Arab Spring to ISIS recruitment
  • High unemployment: 25-30% youth unemployment across the Arab world; higher among educated youth. The paradox: education levels have risen but economies don’t generate appropriate jobs. Engineering graduates drive taxis
  • Rapid urbanization: Urban population has grown from 35% (1950) to 65% (2020). Cairo (21 million), Tehran (15 million), Istanbul (16 million), Baghdad (8 million). Infrastructure cannot keep pace; slums expand; services deteriorate
  • Migration pressures: 4 million Syrians in Turkey; 2 million in Lebanon (25% of population); millions more in Jordan and Egypt. Ongoing flows toward Europe. Internal migration from countryside to cities

The “youth bulge” has political consequences: unemployed young men are available for mobilization—by political movements, by militias, by terrorist organizations.

Governance Failure

States fail to deliver what populations need:

  • Education systems produce unemployable graduates: 20%+ of Arab youth are functionally illiterate despite formal schooling; curricula are outdated; critical thinking is discouraged; STEM education is weak. The result: degrees without skills, expectations without opportunities
  • Health systems are inadequate: COVID-19 exposed weaknesses; life expectancy gains have stalled; brain drain depletes medical staff. Gulf states import healthcare; poor countries cannot provide it
  • Infrastructure is deteriorating: Iraq’s electricity supply is intermittent after 20 years of post-war “reconstruction”; Egypt’s roads, railways, and water systems struggle with population growth; Yemen’s infrastructure has been destroyed
  • Corruption is pervasive: Transparency International ranks most Middle Eastern countries in the bottom half globally. Iraq has “lost” $150 billion since 2003; Lebanon’s central bank governor is under investigation; patronage networks distribute resources to supporters

Poor governance delegitimizes existing states—and creates openings for movements promising better alternatives.

Islamism

Political Islam remains a powerful force, despite setbacks:

  • The Muslim Brotherhood and its successors: Founded 1928 in Egypt; branches across the region. Egypt’s Morsi government (2012-13) was overthrown; Brotherhood is now suppressed in Egypt and UAE but governs (or influences) in Turkey, Tunisia, Gaza, and Jordan
  • Salafist and jihadist movements: Al-Qaeda (founded 1988) launched 9/11; ISIS (2014-2019) ruled territory and drew 40,000 foreign fighters. Both are weakened but not eliminated; ideology persists; new groups emerge
  • Iranian revolutionary model: Velayat-e faqih (guardianship of the jurist) provides an alternative Islamic governance model. Iran exports this ideology through Hezbollah, Iraqi militias, and support for Hamas
  • Competition continues: Between Islamic and secular visions; between different Islamic movements (Brotherhood vs. Salafists vs. Shia); between quietist and activist orientations

Religion and politics remain intertwined. Secularization has not proceeded as many expected; Islam continues to provide frameworks for political mobilization.

Climate Change

Environmental stress is intensifying in a region already at environmental limits:

  • Water scarcity worsening: The Middle East has 5% of world population, 1% of freshwater. Per capita water availability has fallen by 75% since 1960. The Euphrates flow has declined 40% due to Turkish dams; the Jordan River is a trickle
  • Heat waves becoming deadly: Summer temperatures in Gulf cities already exceed safe working limits outdoors. By 2050, Persian Gulf coastal cities may become uninhabitable during summer heat waves. Iraq has recorded temperatures exceeding 52°C
  • Agriculture under pressure: Drought contributed to Syrian uprising (2011 was preceded by worst drought in 900 years). Iraqi and Iranian agriculture are contracting. Food imports are rising
  • Climate migration: Internal migration from drought-affected areas to cities; potential for larger international flows as conditions worsen

The Middle East is among the world’s most climate-vulnerable regions—and among the least prepared institutionally to adapt.

Future Trajectories

Continued Instability

The most likely near-term scenario: - Existing conflicts persist without resolution - New crises emerge periodically - External powers remain involved - Regional rivalries continue

Instability is the equilibrium.

Regional Order

A more optimistic possibility: - Saudi-Iranian accommodation - Arab-Israeli normalization expands - External powers reduce involvement - Regional institutions develop

This would require changes in multiple capitals.

State Collapse

A pessimistic scenario: - Climate and demographic pressures mount - More states fail (following Libya, Syria, Yemen) - Refugee flows destabilize neighbors - Great power competition intensifies

The region could become more dangerous.

Strategic Implications

Energy Transition

As the world moves away from fossil fuels:

  • Gulf states face economic transformation
  • Petro-states must diversify or decline
  • Strategic importance may decrease
  • But the transition will take decades

Great Power Competition

The US, Russia, and China all have interests:

  • US reducing involvement but not departing
  • Russia maintaining presence in Syria
  • China seeking energy and BRI routes

The region will remain contested.

Israel and Normalization

The Abraham Accords represent a shift:

  • Gulf states aligning with Israel against Iran
  • Palestinian issue downgraded in Arab priorities
  • New regional alignments possible

Whether this trend continues remains uncertain.

Conclusion

The Middle East’s instability is not accidental or temporary. It emerges from structural factors: geographic position at the world’s crossroads, hydrocarbon resources that distort political development, colonial borders that created states lacking legitimacy, and external intervention that prevents local equilibria from forming.

Understanding the Middle East requires understanding it as a system—a set of interlocking conflicts, rivalries, and interventions that feed on each other. No single conflict can be resolved in isolation. No external power can impose order. No regional hegemony is achievable.

For geopolitical analysis, the Middle East is a laboratory of complexity: a region where geography, resources, religion, ethnicity, and great power politics interact in ways that resist simple explanation or easy solution. It will remain central to world affairs as long as oil matters—and the consequences of its instability will be felt long after.

The chokepoints will still command shipping. The holy cities will still attract devotion. The conflicts will still generate refugees. Understanding the Middle East’s geopolitical system is essential for anyone seeking to comprehend international politics—and for anyone hoping to someday see the region at peace.

Sources & Further Reading

  • “A Peace to End All Peace: The Fall of the Ottoman Empire and the Creation of the Modern Middle East” by David Fromkin — Essential reading for understanding how the modern Middle Eastern state system was created and why its borders remain contested.
  • “The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money & Power” by Daniel Yergin — The definitive history of oil’s role in shaping Middle Eastern geopolitics and great power intervention in the region.
  • “A History of Modern Palestine” by Ilan Pappe — Comprehensive account of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict that illuminates one of the region’s most intractable disputes.
  • “The Cold War and the Middle East” edited by Yezid Sayigh and Avi Shlaim — Academic analysis of how superpower rivalry shaped the region during the Cold War, establishing patterns that persist.
  • “The New Arab Wars: Uprisings and Anarchy in the Middle East” by Marc Lynch — Analysis of the post-2011 regional upheaval that reshaped the Middle East’s political landscape.