Alexander Dugin

Alexander Gelyevich Dugin (b. January 7, 1962) is the most influential ideologue of Russian neo-Eurasianism—a geopolitical philosophy that positions Russia as the leader of a distinct Eurasian civilization opposed to the liberal, Atlantic West. His work has been credited with providing intellectual foundations for Russian foreign policy under Vladimir Putin, though the extent of his direct influence remains debated. What is undeniable is that Dugin’s ideas circulate widely among Russian elites and have shaped how many understand Russia’s place in the world.

Dugin is simultaneously a serious scholar of geopolitics, a provocative ideologue, and a figure whose thought draws on troubling sources including interwar fascism. Understanding his ideas—without endorsing them—is essential for anyone seeking to comprehend contemporary Russian foreign policy and the ideological challenge it poses to the liberal international order.

The Person¶

Early Life and Influences¶

Dugin’s intellectual formation occurred during the Soviet period’s final decades, in an environment of official Marxism-Leninism but underground intellectual ferment:

Born on January 7, 1962, in Moscow, into the Soviet elite. His father, Gely Dugin, was reportedly a general in Soviet military intelligence (GRU).
Studied at the Moscow Aviation Institute (MAI), a prestigious technical university, but was expelled in 1983 for involvement with dissident and esoteric circles
Became involved in underground nationalist, esoteric, and anti-Soviet movements during the 1980s
Learned multiple languages (German, French, English) and accessed Western texts unavailable to most Soviet citizens
Participated in the “memory” (Pamyat) nationalist society and other marginal groups
Developed a synthesis of geopolitics, traditionalism, and Russian nationalism that would become his signature contribution

His early influences were eclectic and sometimes disturbing: the French New Right (Alain de Benoist, GRECE movement), Italian fascist philosopher Julius Evola (1898-1974) and his ideas about spiritual aristocracy, the Traditionalist school of Rene Guenon (1886-1951), German conservative revolutionaries like Ernst Junger, and geopolitical thinkers including halford-mackinder and Karl Haushofer. He also drew on Russian religious philosophy (Dostoevsky, Soloviev) and the original Eurasianist movement of the 1920s.

This eclectic mix—combining esoteric spirituality, fascist thought, Russian nationalism, and classical geopolitics—characterizes Dugin’s mature work.

Post-Soviet Career¶

After 1991, Dugin emerged from the underground into public intellectual life. The collapse of the Soviet Union created space for previously suppressed ideologies, and Dugin seized the opportunity:

Co-founded the National Bolshevik Party (NBP) with writer Eduard Limonov in 1993, combining radical nationalism with leftist aesthetics (left the party in 1998 over ideological differences)
Published “Foundations of Geopolitics” (1997), which became his most influential work
Founded the Eurasia Party (2001), later reorganized as the Eurasia Movement (2003)
Appointed Professor and Head of the Department of Sociology of International Relations at Moscow State University (Russia’s most prestigious university) in 2008
Dismissed from Moscow State University in 2014 following an online petition criticizing his advocacy of violence against Ukrainians
Prolific author of over 30 books and countless articles, interviews, and online content
Cultivated relationships with military, intelligence, and political figures, though the extent of these connections is disputed
Became internationally known as a theorist of Russian expansionism and anti-liberalism

His career has combined academic work with political activism and media presence—he has been a regular commentator on Russian television and maintains extensive online platforms.

Controversial Figure and Personal Tragedy¶

Dugin is deeply controversial both within Russia and internationally:

Accused of fascism by critics (he rejects the label, arguing his “Fourth Political Theory” transcends fascism)
Subject to Western sanctions (US, UK, EU) for his role in promoting Russian aggression
Either described as “Putin’s brain” and influential advisor or dismissed as a marginal figure with no real policy impact—assessments vary dramatically depending on the source
Simultaneously celebrated by anti-liberal movements worldwide and condemned by liberal democrats

On August 20, 2022, Dugin’s daughter Darya Dugina (b. 1992), herself a political commentator who shared her father’s views, was killed by a car bomb near Moscow. Russian authorities blamed Ukrainian intelligence; Ukraine denied involvement. Dugin had reportedly been the intended target. The assassination brought Dugin to global attention and made him a symbol of the ideological dimension of the Russia-Ukraine conflict.

The difficulty of assessing his actual influence reflects broader challenges in understanding Russian politics, where formal positions matter less than informal networks, and ideological justifications may follow rather than precede policy decisions.

Key Ideas¶

Neo-Eurasianism¶

Dugin’s central framework builds on earlier Eurasianist thought:

Classical Eurasianism emerged among Russian emigres in the 1920s, arguing that Russia was neither Europe nor Asia but a distinct civilization—Eurasia—with its own historical path and cultural values.

Dugin’s neo-Eurasianism updates this framework:

Russia should lead a Eurasian bloc against Atlantic (American-led) hegemony
Liberal democracy and Western values are alien to Russian civilization
Eurasia’s integration under Russian leadership is historically necessary
The struggle between Land (Eurasia) and Sea (the Atlantic West) is the fundamental axis of world politics

Geopolitical Dualism¶

Drawing on Mackinder’s heartland-theory, Dugin posits a fundamental conflict:

Tellurocracy (Land Power): Represented by the Eurasian heartland, characterized by tradition, hierarchy, spirituality, and communal values. Russia is its natural leader.

Thalassocracy (Sea Power): Represented by the Atlantic powers (UK historically, US now), characterized by commerce, individualism, liberalism, and materialist values.

This is not merely strategic competition but civilizational struggle—an existential conflict between incompatible ways of life.

The Fourth Political Theory¶

In “The Fourth Political Theory” (2009), Dugin argues:

The twentieth century saw three political theories: 1. Liberalism (which won) 2. Communism (which lost) 3. Fascism (which lost)

Liberalism is now hegemonic but contains the seeds of its own destruction through nihilism, decadence, and the destruction of all traditional identities.

A Fourth Political Theory is needed that: - Rejects all three previous ideologies - Draws on pre-modern traditions and Heideggerian philosophy - Centers on “Dasein” (existential being) rather than individual, class, or race - Defends civilizational plurality against liberal universalism

This Fourth Theory is deliberately eclectic, drawing on both left and right critiques of liberalism.

Multipolarity¶

Dugin advocates a multipolar world order:

The unipolar American-led order must be replaced
Multiple civilizational poles (Russia/Eurasia, China, India, Islamic world, etc.) should coexist
Each civilization has the right to its own values and political forms
Liberal universalism is merely Western imperialism in disguise
Russia should build alliances with other anti-liberal powers

This vision directly challenges the liberal international order and provides justification for anti-Western coalitions.

Russia’s Mission¶

For Dugin, Russia has a special mission:

To lead Eurasian resistance to Atlantic hegemony
To preserve traditional values against liberal decadence
To unite the post-Soviet space under Russian leadership
To offer an alternative to Western modernity
To fulfill its historical destiny as a great civilization

This messianic vision provides ideological motivation for expansionism.

Major Works¶

“Foundations of Geopolitics” (1997)¶

“Osnovy Geopolitiki” (Foundations of Geopolitics: The Geopolitical Future of Russia) is Dugin’s most influential work. Published in 1997, it reportedly became a textbook in Russian military academies and staff colleges, shaping how a generation of Russian officers and officials thought about strategy:

Synthesized classical geopolitics—Mackinder, Karl Haushofer, and others—for a Russian audience that had been deprived of this tradition during the Soviet period
Presented a comprehensive strategy for Russian expansion and Western weakening
Advocated annexing Ukraine or, failing that, fostering its internal divisions: “Ukraine as a state has no geopolitical meaning… it should be divided along regional lines”
Called for destabilizing the United States by promoting racial, political, and social divisions: “It is especially important to introduce geopolitical disorder into internal American activity, encouraging all kinds of separatism and ethnic, social, and racial conflicts”
Proposed a German-Russian alliance to split Europe from the Atlantic world, exploiting German resentment of American domination
Recommended alliance with Iran and accommodation with Japan (ceding disputed islands in exchange for neutrality)
Described the fundamental geopolitical conflict as Land (Russia/Eurasia) versus Sea (United States/Atlanticism)

Many of the book’s recommendations have appeared to influence—or at least anticipated—actual Russian policy: interference in American elections, cultivation of European far-right parties, the annexation of Crimea, the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Whether this represents Dugin’s influence or merely his accurate prediction of Russian interests remains debated.

“The Fourth Political Theory” (2009)¶

Dugin’s most ambitious philosophical work, translated into English in 2012:

Critiqued liberalism as civilization’s dead end—victorious but spiritually exhausted, leading to nihilism, consumerism, and the destruction of all traditional identities
Proposed a “Fourth Political Theory” to succeed liberalism, communism, and fascism—all three of which had failed
Drew heavily on Martin Heidegger’s philosophy, particularly the concept of “Dasein” (being-there) as an alternative foundation to the liberal individual, the Marxist class, or the fascist race/nation
Incorporated Traditionalist thought (Guenon, Evola) about the decline of modernity and the need to recover premodern wisdom
Aimed at building an anti-liberal coalition across ideological lines—uniting critics of liberalism from left and right
Argued for civilizational pluralism: each civilization has the right to its own values, and liberal universalism is merely Western imperialism disguised as universal values

The book has been translated into multiple languages and discussed internationally, finding audiences among both academic theorists and political activists opposed to liberalism.

“Eurasian Mission” (2014)¶

An accessible introduction to Dugin’s Eurasianist thought, published as events in Ukraine were unfolding:

Explained neo-Eurasianism for a general audience without the dense philosophical apparatus of “The Fourth Political Theory”
Connected geopolitics to cultural and spiritual questions, presenting Eurasianist identity as not merely strategic but civilizational
Addressed the Ukraine crisis from a Eurasianist perspective, explaining why Ukraine’s Western orientation threatened Russian interests
Served as propaganda for Russian policy while framing that policy in ideological terms

“The Great Awakening vs. The Great Reset” (2021)¶

Dugin’s engagement with the politics of the COVID-19 era and its aftermath:

Critiqued Klaus Schwab’s “Great Reset” as a liberal elite project to impose technocratic control
Positioned populist movements globally—Trump supporters in America, Yellow Vests in France, Brexit voters in Britain—as allies against liberal globalist elites
Connected the American “MAGA” movement to global anti-liberal resistance, despite obvious differences between American conservatism and Russian neo-Eurasianism
Sought to build a transnational anti-globalist coalition uniting diverse movements against the liberal order

This work demonstrated Dugin’s ongoing efforts to position himself as an ideological entrepreneur connecting disparate anti-liberal movements worldwide.

Influence¶

On Russian Foreign Policy¶

Dugin’s influence on the Kremlin is debated:

Arguments for significant influence: - His concepts appear in Russian official discourse - “Foundations of Geopolitics” reportedly used by military - The Ukraine invasion follows patterns he advocated - Putin’s rhetoric echoes Eurasianist themes

Arguments against overestimating influence: - Dugin has no formal government position - He was dismissed from Moscow State University - Russian policy has multiple determinants - Direct connection to decisions is unproven

The truth likely lies between: Dugin articulates ideas that circulate among Russian elites without being their sole source.

On Western Discourse¶

Dugin has become important for Western understanding of Russia:

Cited in analyses of Russian foreign policy
Studied by intelligence agencies and think tanks
Invoked to explain Russian behavior
Featured in documentaries and journalism

He has become a lens through which the West views Russian thinking.

On the Global Far Right¶

Dugin has cultivated relationships with far-right movements:

Connections to European New Right
Outreach to American alt-right
Links to nationalist parties across Europe
Promotion of anti-liberal alliance

These connections suggest an attempt to build transnational movement against liberalism.

Criticisms¶

Fascism and Dangerous Ideas¶

Critics argue Dugin:

Draws on fascist sources (Evola, Carl Schmitt)
Promotes ethnic nationalism and imperialism
His ideas justify violence and aggression
He is essentially a fascist despite denials
His influence contributed to the Ukraine war

The association with fascist thought is not incidental but central to his project.

Intellectual Incoherence¶

Scholarly critics argue:

His philosophy is eclectic to the point of incoherence
He misreads the thinkers he cites
Geopolitical determinism is intellectually unsound
The “Fourth Political Theory” is not a theory but a grab bag
His work is propaganda, not serious scholarship

Overestimation of Influence¶

Some argue Western observers overstate Dugin’s importance:

He is convenient shorthand, not accurate analysis
Russian policy has material rather than ideological drivers
Putin is a pragmatist, not an ideologue
Treating Dugin as Putin’s brain misunderstands both

Moral Criticism¶

Beyond intellectual critique, moral objections arise:

His ideas have been used to justify aggression and war crimes
He has explicitly called for violence
He celebrates authoritarianism and rejects human rights
Engagement with his work risks legitimizing it

Contemporary Relevance¶

The Ukraine War¶

Dugin’s long advocacy for absorbing Ukraine gives his work retrospective significance:

“Foundations of Geopolitics” explicitly called for Ukraine’s dismemberment
His arguments about Ukraine’s artificial nature echo Kremlin rhetoric
The war can be read as implementing Eurasianist strategy
His framework helps explain Russian objectives

Western Populism¶

Dugin has reached out to Western anti-establishment movements:

He sees Trump, Brexit, and European populism as potential allies
His anti-globalist message resonates across ideological lines
The “multipolar” vision appeals to those opposed to American hegemony
Some Western rightists cite Dugin favorably

China-Russia Alignment¶

Dugin’s framework illuminates Sino-Russian cooperation:

Both reject Western liberal hegemony
Multipolarity provides ideological basis for partnership
Eurasianist discourse welcomes Chinese rise
The relationship serves anti-liberal strategic purposes

The Ideological Challenge¶

Dugin represents something broader than himself:

A rejection of liberal universalism
A defense of civilizational plurality against Western norms
An intellectual framework for anti-Western coalition
A challenge that liberal order must address

Intellectual Method and Sources¶

Understanding Dugin requires recognizing his intellectual method:

Eclecticism¶

Dugin synthesizes sources that others would consider incompatible: left and right, religious and secular, modern and premodern, Eastern and Western. He draws on:

German philosophy (Heidegger, Schmitt, Nietzsche)
French New Right (Alain de Benoist)
Italian fascism (Evola)
Traditionalism (Guenon)
Russian religious philosophy (Dostoevsky, Soloviev, Berdyaev)
Classical geopolitics (Mackinder, Haushofer)
Soviet theorists (Gumilev’s ethnogenesis theory)

This eclecticism can appear incoherent but serves a purpose: constructing an anti-liberal framework that can appeal across ideological lines.

Strategic Ambiguity¶

Dugin operates at multiple levels simultaneously:

Serious philosophical works engaging Western thinkers
Popular propaganda for Russian audiences
International outreach to anti-liberal movements
Academic positions at prestigious institutions
Media commentary and online presence

This allows him to claim scholarly credentials while engaging in political activism, and to disavow extreme statements when convenient while his followers embrace them.

Use of Paradox¶

Dugin employs paradox deliberately: he celebrates chaos as creation, advocates violence as purification, and presents reaction as revolution. This can confuse Western observers expecting logical consistency but resonates with audiences attracted to radical gestures.

Conclusion¶

Alexander Dugin is a figure who demands critical engagement. His neo-Eurasianist ideology provides a coherent (if objectionable) alternative to Western liberal internationalism. His geopolitical framework, rooted in classical thinkers like Mackinder but updated for contemporary conditions, has shaped how many Russians understand their country’s place in the world.

Understanding Dugin does not mean accepting his ideas. His thought draws on fascist sources, justifies aggression, and promotes a world order fundamentally hostile to liberal values of human rights and individual freedom. His explicit calls for violence, his celebration of war, and his denial of Ukrainian national existence place him outside acceptable discourse by any humane standard. But dismissing him as merely a crank underestimates the appeal of his ideas and the challenge they pose.

The liberal international order faces ideological competitors. Dugin articulates one such competitor with unusual clarity. His vision of civilizational blocs, multipolar order, and Eurasian resistance to Atlantic hegemony resonates with many who reject Western dominance—not only in Russia but in parts of Europe, America, and the Global South. Whether his influence on actual Russian policy is direct or diffuse, his ideas circulate and matter.

The 2022 invasion of Ukraine can be read through Dugin’s framework: the denial of Ukrainian statehood, the claim that Ukraine is merely a Western project to weaken Russia, the vision of Russia’s civilizational mission—all echo themes Dugin has articulated for decades. Whether Putin reads Dugin or merely shares similar views, the ideological framework matches.

Engaging with Dugin means taking seriously both the intellectual content of his arguments and the political uses to which they are put. His anti-liberalism speaks to genuine grievances about Western dominance, cultural homogenization, and the dislocations of globalization. Dismissing these grievances as merely Russian propaganda ignores why Dugin’s message finds audiences. At the same time, his “solutions”—authoritarian empire, civilizational warfare, rejection of human rights—would produce worlds far worse than the liberal order he attacks.

In a world where great power competition has returned and the liberal order is contested, understanding its challengers is not optional. Dugin represents the ideological dimension of that challenge—the argument that liberalism is not universal but merely one civilization’s values, that Russia represents an alternative, and that the future belongs to multipolar civilizational conflict rather than liberal convergence. Whether this vision prevails or fails, it shapes the world we inhabit.

Sources & Further Reading¶

Alexander Dugin, “The Fourth Political Theory” (2012, English translation) - The most accessible statement of Dugin’s political philosophy, arguing for a new ideology beyond liberalism, communism, and fascism. Essential for understanding his intellectual project.

John Dunlop, “Aleksandr Dugin’s Foundations of Geopolitics” (2004) - A detailed analysis of Dugin’s most influential work, examining its arguments and potential influence on Russian policy. Valuable for those who cannot read the Russian original.

Marlene Laruelle, “Russian Eurasianism: An Ideology of Empire” (2008) - The leading scholarly study of Eurasianist ideology, placing Dugin within its broader intellectual history. Essential context for understanding where his ideas come from.

Anton Shekhovtsov, “Russia and the Western Far Right” (2017) - Examines connections between Russian actors (including Dugin) and Western far-right movements. Important for understanding the transnational dimension of his influence.

Charles Clover, “Black Wind, White Snow: The Rise of Russia’s New Nationalism” (2016) - A journalist’s account of Russian nationalist movements, including substantial material on Dugin. Readable introduction to the political context of his ideas.