John Mearsheimer

John Joseph Mearsheimer (b. December 14, 1947) is the R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago and the most prominent exponent of “offensive realism” in contemporary international relations theory. His work on great power competition, published over decades, gained new relevance after Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine—making him one of the most cited, debated, and contested scholars in the field. Whether hailed as a prophet or condemned as an apologist, Mearsheimer cannot be ignored.

Early Life and Education¶

Mearsheimer was born in Brooklyn, New York, and grew up on Long Island. His background was distinctly American—unlike the immigrant strategists Kennan, Brzezinski, or Kissinger, he brought no personal experience of European tragedy to his analysis.

He graduated from the United States Military Academy at West Point in 1970, receiving a commission in the U.S. Air Force. He served for five years (1970-1975), reaching the rank of captain, before leaving military service for academic life. This military background informed his later work—Mearsheimer writes about war and power with the matter-of-factness of someone who has worn a uniform.

He earned his PhD in political science from Cornell University in 1980, writing his dissertation under Richard Rosecrance. At Cornell, he absorbed the structural realist tradition associated with Kenneth Waltz, whose “Theory of International Politics” (1979) had revolutionized the field. Mearsheimer would build on Waltz’s foundation while pushing it in more aggressive directions.

Offensive Realism¶

The Core Argument¶

Mearsheimer’s theoretical contribution—developed most fully in “The Tragedy of Great Power Politics” (2001)—argues that the international system compels great powers to maximize their relative power:

“The overriding goal of each state is to maximize its share of world power, which means gaining power at the expense of other states.”

This is “offensive” realism because states do not merely seek security (as “defensive” realists like Waltz argue) but pursue regional hegemony whenever circumstances permit. Security is not enough; states want to be so powerful that no other state can threaten them. This requires dominating one’s own region.

The theory’s name is significant: it is not optimistic about human nature or hopeful about cooperation. Great power politics is tragic precisely because states trapped in the system must compete even when they prefer peace.

Key Assumptions¶

Mearsheimer builds on five bedrock premises:

Anarchy: No world government exists to protect states from each other. States operate in a self-help system where they must provide for their own security.
Offensive military capability: All great powers possess some capacity to harm others. No state can be certain it is safe from attack.
Uncertainty: States can never be certain of others’ intentions. Today’s friend might be tomorrow’s enemy. Capabilities can be measured; intentions cannot.
Survival: States seek to maintain their sovereignty and territorial integrity. This is the minimum goal—without survival, other goals are meaningless.
Rationality: States are strategic actors that think about how to survive. They respond to incentives and constraints; they calculate costs and benefits.

From these assumptions, Mearsheimer derives a bleak conclusion: states are condemned to compete, and the system generates tragedy regardless of intentions. Good intentions do not create security; power does. States that ignore this reality invite disaster.

Regional Hegemony¶

The ultimate goal of great powers is regional hegemony—dominance of their own region while preventing rivals from achieving similar dominance elsewhere:

The united-states achieved regional hegemony in the Western Hemisphere by the early twentieth century. The Monroe Doctrine, the Mexican-American War, the Spanish-American War all served this goal.
The U.S. then acted to prevent any Eurasian power from achieving equivalent dominance—intervening in World War I, World War II, and the Cold War to prevent German, Japanese, or Soviet hegemony.
This explains American foreign policy’s apparent inconsistency: Washington supported Britain against Germany, then supported Germany against the Soviet Union, then supported various powers against China. The constant was preventing Eurasian hegemony.
China is now attempting what the U.S. achieved: regional hegemony in Asia. This makes U.S.-China conflict highly likely.

The Stopping Power of Water¶

Mearsheimer argues that oceans prevent global hegemony:

No state can project enough power across vast oceans to dominate distant regions. Amphibious operations are extremely difficult; sustaining overseas conquest is harder still.
The United States is extraordinarily safe because vast oceans separate it from potential rivals in Europe and Asia. America is a “blessed” state geographically.
Regional hegemons can be thwarted by offshore balancers—distant great powers that intervene to prevent domination.
Global hegemony is therefore impossible; regional hegemony is the maximum achievable. Even the United States at its peak could not dominate Eurasia directly.

The Rise of China¶

The Coming Conflict¶

Mearsheimer has long predicted that China’s rise would generate intense security competition with the United States:

“China cannot rise peacefully… The United States will go to enormous lengths to prevent China from achieving regional hegemony.”

His logic follows from offensive realism: a powerful China will seek regional dominance, and the US will resist, just as Britain and America resisted German dominance of Europe.

Asian Dynamics¶

Mearsheimer predicts:

China will build formidable military power
Neighbors will balance against China (with American support)
Crises over Taiwan, the South China Sea, and other flashpoints will intensify
War is not inevitable but is a serious risk

Implications¶

If Mearsheimer is right:

Economic interdependence will not prevent conflict
Liberal institutions will not constrain Chinese behavior
The future looks more like 1914 Europe than 1990s globalization
American policymakers should prepare for long-term competition

NATO Expansion and Ukraine¶

The Argument¶

Mearsheimer has been the most prominent academic critic of NATO expansion, arguing since the 1990s that:

Expanding NATO into Russia’s sphere of influence was a strategic blunder
Russia would inevitably resist Western encroachment on its borders
Ukraine, as a buffer state, should not be pulled into Western institutions
Western policy provoked the very Russian aggression it claimed to prevent

This argument became globally prominent after Russia’s 2022 invasion.

The Logic¶

Mearsheimer’s analysis applies offensive realism to Russian behavior:

Russia, like any great power, seeks to dominate its region
NATO expansion threatens Russian security by moving Western military power toward Russian borders
Ukraine’s potential NATO membership was an existential threat from Moscow’s perspective
Russian aggression, while illegal and tragic, was predictable and in some sense provoked

The Controversy¶

This argument has generated intense debate:

Critics argue: - It blames the victim (Ukraine) and the West rather than the aggressor - It denies agency to Eastern European states seeking NATO membership - It ignores that Russia’s actions prove why NATO expansion was justified - It is essentially apologetics for Russian imperialism

Supporters argue: - Understanding causation is not the same as justification - Ignoring Russian security concerns was strategically foolish - The outcome (war in Europe) validates Mearsheimer’s warnings - Policy should be based on how states actually behave, not how we wish they would

Mearsheimer’s Response¶

Mearsheimer distinguishes explanation from justification:

“The question of who is morally responsible for the Ukraine crisis and the question of what caused it are separate questions.”

He maintains that the West bears primary responsibility for the crisis while acknowledging that Russia’s invasion is illegal and morally wrong.

Academic Career¶

University of Chicago¶

Mearsheimer joined the University of Chicago’s Political Science Department in 1982 and has remained there for over four decades. Chicago’s department has been a center of realist thought, with scholars like Hans Morgenthau having taught there. Mearsheimer became the R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor—one of the university’s highest honors.

He has supervised numerous doctoral students who have gone on to prominent academic and policy careers. His courses on great power politics and American foreign policy have shaped generations of students, many of whom became policymakers, analysts, and scholars.

Other Major Works¶

Beyond offensive realism, Mearsheimer has written influential works on diverse topics:

Conventional Deterrence (1983): His first book, based on his dissertation, analyzed when conventional military deterrence succeeds or fails. Drawing on historical case studies, he argued that deterrence depends on the balance of forces and the prospects for quick victory. The book established his reputation as a serious military analyst.

Liddell Hart and the Weight of History (1988): A revisionist biography examining how the British military theorist B.H. Liddell Hart rewrote history to claim credit for ideas he had actually opposed.

The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy (2007, with Stephen Walt): Argued that the “Israel lobby”—a loose coalition of organizations and individuals—distorts American foreign policy in the Middle East, leading the U.S. to support Israel even when this harms American interests. The book generated intense controversy, with critics accusing Mearsheimer and Walt of antisemitism and defenders praising their willingness to challenge taboos.

Why Leaders Lie: The Truth About Lying in International Politics (2011): Examined when and why states engage in deception, distinguishing between lying to foreign audiences and lying to domestic ones. Counterintuitively, Mearsheimer found that states lie more often to their own people than to foreigners.

The Great Delusion: Liberal Dreams and International Realities (2018): Critiqued “liberal hegemony” as American grand strategy. Mearsheimer argued that the post-Cold War attempt to spread democracy and integrate the world into American-led institutions had failed catastrophically, producing endless wars in the Middle East, alienating Russia and China, and wasting American resources. The book represented his fullest statement of why liberal internationalism was doomed to fail.

Critiques¶

Structural Determinism¶

Critics argue Mearsheimer:

Overemphasizes structure and underemphasizes agency
Treats states as billiard balls, ignoring domestic politics
Cannot explain variation in state behavior
Makes unfalsifiable predictions (competition is always explained by the theory)

The Liberal Critique¶

Liberal international relations scholars argue:

Institutions can constrain state behavior
Economic interdependence raises the costs of war
Democratic states behave differently than autocracies
The “tragedy” is not inevitable but results from bad choices

The Russia-Ukraine Critique¶

Specifically on Ukraine, critics argue Mearsheimer:

Ignores Russian imperialism predating NATO expansion
Denies legitimate Ukrainian aspirations for Western integration
Treats spheres of influence as natural rights of great powers
Essentially endorses great power domination of smaller states

Normative Concerns¶

Some worry that offensive realism:

Legitimizes aggressive behavior as “rational”
Counsels accommodation of authoritarianism
Abandons smaller states to domination by neighbors
Is self-fulfilling (treating conflict as inevitable makes it so)

Influence¶

Academic Impact¶

Mearsheimer is among the most cited scholars in international relations, with citation counts in the tens of thousands:

“The Tragedy of Great Power Politics” is assigned in graduate seminars worldwide and has been translated into multiple languages
His theoretical framework shapes debates about China’s rise and what it means for world order
His arguments appear in policy discussions in Washington, Beijing, Moscow, and capitals worldwide
Graduate students across the field engage with his work, whether agreeing or disagreeing
The “offensive realism” label has become a recognized theoretical category

His influence extends beyond political science to history, military studies, and public discourse. Even critics must engage with his arguments.

Policy Relevance¶

His arguments influence real-world debates across the political spectrum:

China hawks cite his predictions about inevitable competition to justify military buildup and confrontation
Restraint advocates cite his critiques of liberal hegemony to argue for reducing American overseas commitments
NATO critics cite his warnings about expansion to argue that Western policy provoked Russian aggression
Realists of all types engage with his framework, whether accepting offensive realism’s logic or preferring defensive alternatives

His influence crosses ideological lines: both left-wing critics of American empire and right-wing nationalists critical of international institutions find ammunition in his work.

Public Intellectual¶

Mearsheimer has become a prominent public figure, unusual for an academic theorist:

His lectures on Ukraine—particularly a 2015 talk at the University of Chicago titled “Why is Ukraine the West’s Fault?”—have accumulated millions of YouTube views
He speaks to general audiences worldwide, drawing large crowds for academic lectures
He appears in documentaries, podcasts, and media interviews regularly
He has become (somewhat uncomfortably, he admits) a celebrity in circles critical of Western policy, including Russian state media, which cites him extensively
His willingness to engage publicly on controversial topics—NATO expansion, Israel, China—has made him simultaneously famous and notorious

Assessment¶

What He Gets Right¶

Great power competition is a persistent feature of international relations
States do respond to shifts in relative power
Liberal optimism about the “end of history” proved premature
NATO expansion did provoke Russian backlash (though whether it was wise remains contested)

What He May Get Wrong¶

Conflict may not be as inevitable as he suggests
Institutions and norms may matter more than he allows
His policy recommendations (accommodate authoritarians) may be morally problematic
Structural theories cannot capture everything important

The Enduring Value¶

Regardless of one’s views, Mearsheimer forces engagement with uncomfortable questions:

What causes great power conflict?
Can rising powers be accommodated?
What are the limits of liberal international order?
How should small states navigate great power competition?

Personal Style and Character¶

Those who know Mearsheimer describe distinctive personal qualities:

Directness: He states his views bluntly, without diplomatic hedging. This clarity makes his arguments easy to understand—and easy to attack.
Debating skill: He is an effective speaker who relishes intellectual combat. His public debates draw large audiences.
Stubbornness: He does not back down from controversial positions, even when the professional costs are significant.
Midwestern sensibility: Despite decades in academia, he retains a pragmatic, no-nonsense style that contrasts with theoretical abstraction.
Accessibility: Unlike many theorists, he writes clearly for general audiences and engages with non-specialists.

Conclusion¶

John Mearsheimer represents the continuation of realist thought in an era that had hoped realism was obsolete. His predictions about China’s rise and NATO expansion have proven prescient enough to demand attention, even from those who reject his conclusions. The 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine made his earlier warnings impossible to ignore—though whether the invasion vindicated his analysis or refuted it remains bitterly contested.

“The Tragedy of Great Power Politics” captures something essential: the international system creates pressures that good intentions alone cannot overcome. States trapped in anarchy must compete for power regardless of ideology or leadership. Whether this tragedy is truly inevitable—or whether human agency, institutions, and norms can construct alternatives—remains the central debate in international relations.

Mearsheimer’s work is not comfortable. It suggests limits to what liberal order can achieve and counsels policies that may require abandoning principles Americans hold dear. His framework implies that small states cannot escape great power domination, that economic interdependence will not prevent war, that democracy promotion is dangerous folly. If he is right, the hopeful narratives of liberal internationalism are illusions.

But discomfort is not refutation. The questions he raises—about power, security, and the persistence of conflict—demand answers from anyone who thinks seriously about international politics. That great power competition has returned, that the post-Cold War peace proved temporary, that China and Russia challenge American-led order—these developments fit Mearsheimer’s predictions better than the optimistic expectations of the 1990s.

Whether we like his answers or not, Mearsheimer forces us to confront the hardest questions about international politics. In an era of great power competition, his analysis of “the tragedy” deserves engagement rather than dismissal.

Sources & Further Reading¶

The Tragedy of Great Power Politics by John J. Mearsheimer — His theoretical masterwork laying out offensive realism, essential for understanding his framework for analyzing international relations.
The Great Delusion: Liberal Dreams and International Realities by John J. Mearsheimer — His critique of liberal hegemony as American grand strategy, explaining why he believes liberal internationalism is doomed to fail.
Why Leaders Lie: The Truth About Lying in International Politics by John J. Mearsheimer — Extends his realist analysis to examine how and why states engage in deception.
Theory of International Politics by Kenneth N. Waltz — The foundational text of structural realism that Mearsheimer builds upon and modifies with his offensive variant.